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SYNOPSIS
In a mixed economy the implementation of planning 
policies must, to a large extent, depend upon the actions 
of the private sector. This places an onus on the planning 
system to understand and appreciate how its objectives 
can be achieved through the. management of market forces.
The present study attempts to examine some of the problems 
which this can pose; particularly in relation to the control 
of private housebuilders. It is- not, however, intended 
to be a comprehensive essay on the relationship between 
planning and the market. Rather, the emphasis is placed 
throughout on an examination of the practical problems 
which planners face in this respect; and on considering 
ho?/ the operation of market forces can frustrate the 
planning system in its efforts to control private invest­
ment .
The study is structured in the following manner:
Chapter One sets out to establish the rationale for 
land-use planning intervening in the operation of the 
market. Firstly, planning can be justified on the grounds 
that its purpose is to compensate for the imperfections 
which characterise the workings of the land market.
Planning, in these circumstances, restricts itself to 
the task of removing any obstructions which hinder the 
efficient operation of market forces; playing, in effect, 
a passive rather than an active role. Secondly, planning 
can legitimize its actions by pointing out that the 
unfettered operation of market forces will inevitably 
work to the disadvantage of those in greatest need.
Planning must, therefore, play a more active role, 
challenging the way in which private agents operate in
the market. The question is whether or not planning can 
actually fulfill this task, hearing in mind both the 
tools which are available to carry out land-use planning; 
and the hostility which this course of action is likely 
to generate in the private sector.
Chapter Two examines some of the practical implica­
tions of these problems by looking at the way in v/hich 
the economics of private housebuilding can create.special 
problems for the planning process. Here the emphasis 
is placed upon developing a critique of the land-use 
planning system by illustrating the limited opportunity 
which it has to control the decisions made by private 
builders, operating in the land and development market.
The chapter highlights the conflicting and variable 
pressures which a planner can experience when attempting 
to deal directly with the market.
Chapter Three develops these considerations further 
with a study of the private builder/public planner rel­
ationship in the West of Scotland. The study traces,in 
some detail, the way in which the housing and land markets 
have developed in the area in order to stress their 
importance in determining the milieu within v/hich land- 
use planning must take place. This provides the essent­
ial background for an analysis of the conflict between 
Strathclyde Region and the private housebuilders, over 
the allocation of land for private housing in the Str­
ucture Plan. Certain features of this conflict cogently 
illustrate how past and prevailing market forces can 
circumscribe the actions of planners. The role of the 
housebuilding lobby, representing the market, and the 
Secretary of State, representing central government, 
in determining the outcome of this conflict are seen as 
crucial.
Chapter Four deals with the practical problems 
v/hich Glasgow District Council face in their efforts
to manage ana airect tne activities 0 1 private nouse- 
builders. The influence which the micro-political env­
ironment can have on the planner/market relationship is 
examined. In addition,the methods used by the planners 
to increase the level of 1 in-town* private housebuilding 
are examined.
Basing its conclusions on evidence detailed in the 
previous two chapters the final chapter analyses the 
problems which can arise when planning attempts to in-' 
fluence the operation of the market-motivated, private 
sector. The chapter also includes some general suggestions 
on how the planning system might be made both more eff­
ective and more sensitive in its efforts to cope with 
the management of market forces.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
INTRODUCTION
In a mixed economy the land-use planner has to  recognise th a t his ability to 
a tta in  certain  objectives could be hampered by the need to  take account of 
m arket forces. The planning system can, a t present, only influence the location 
of private developments through its powers of negative control. While the local 
authorities prepare plans indicating those areas in which certain  kinds of 
development are preferred, they have only a lim ited ability to  directly  carry out 
any of these projects. The in itiative to  develop the land allocated in plans has, in 
consequence, lain largely with m arket m otivated, private enterprise. This means 
th a t the relationship between m arket forces and planning policies is c ritica l, as it 
can determ ine the way in which future development occurs.
The present study sets out to  examine firstly , why it was thought necessary for 
planning to  control m arket forces; and secondly, what difficulties such policies 
can give rise to  in both plan-making and plan-im plem entation. The la tte r  
question is analysed in relation to the a ttem pts made by land-use planning to  
control the actions of private housebuilders.
The relationship which currently  exists between the public and private sector is 
usually characterised by mutual d istrust and misunderstanding. The quality, 
com m itm ent and accountability of local authority  planners is frequently 
challenged by the private sector. While to  many planners, the private sector is 
"m otivated by greed, steeped in speculation, staffed  by furtive entrepreneurs 
and marshalled by a landed profession deeply sunk in abject cynicism" (R atcliffe 
1976). It seems almost inevitable th a t there will be a continuing tension between 
the private sector's profit motive and the public sector's social objective of 
ensuring development benefits those in need (Hambleton 1980).
Despite this almost traditional hostility, the planner has to  operate within a 
society which is generally amenable to  m arket operations. Therefore, in order to  
a tta in  the social objectives se t by the  community he must function as an agent of 
the m arket if he is to  encourage private sector investm ent in areas of need 
(R atcliffe 1976). This would suggest th a t any urban policy which is designed to 
operate in a mixed economy, must "face the problem of how and to  what extent 
the m arket in capital and land can be harnessed, regulated or controlled" 
(MacKay and Cox 1979). I f , therefore, a planning authority  is to  manage the 
orderly development of a town or city then it must show an ability, and a 
willingness, to  understand both the land and development m arkets.
This study investigates whether or not these c rite ria  are being m et; and if by 
themselves, they allow the planning system to  control m arket forces.
It is a question which is becoming increasingly im portant as the pressure grows 
on planners to  re-exam ine the relationship which presently exists between the 
public and private sectors. The problem of inner areas, in particular, is fe lt to 
be so acute "that it can only be effectively  tackled by the public and private 
sectors working in concert" (Hart 1980).
This was a view which obtained perhaps its first airing in a report entitled  "New 
Homes in the Cities", the main them e of which was concerned with a ttrac tin g  
private housing investm ent back to  city  centres (National Economic Development 
O ffice 1972). It was fe lt th a t an increase in the level of private housebuilding in 
the  inner city would not only supplement council housebuilding, in term s of the 
number of houses built and improvement of the physical environment; but would 
also "widen the  choice of house types and tenure available in the inner areas, 
thus potentially increasing the a ttrac tio n  for people from outside, as well as 
affording a lternatives for those already there" (Nicholls e t al 1980).
These are advantages which have a ttra c ted  the  in terest of both members and 
officials in local authorities. Consequently, a number of urban planning 
policies, in recent years, have been aimed a t redirecting the activ ities of private 
housebuilders away from suburban sites, and towards the conurbations.
These a ttem pts to  control the actions of one group of private sector agents, 
operating in the land and development m arkets, provide an ideal opportunity to  
investigate the  relationship between land-use planning and m arket forces. The 
question being posed is whether or not the land-use planning system can 
effectively  influence the actions of private builders. The problem is examined in 
relation to  the effo rts  made by both Strathclyde Regional, and Glasgow D istrict 
Councils in order to control private sector investm ent in housing.
The study begins, however, by examining the rationale for land-use planning 
intervening in the operation of m arket forces. This is done in order to  establish 
a background against which both la te r questions can be considered, and the 
success or failure of land-use planning in its e ffo rts  to  control m arket forces can 
be judged.
CHAPTER ONE
LAND-USE PLANNING AND THE MARKET: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS.
51.1 Land-use planning, which relies on the powers made available to  local authorities 
to  grant or withhold planning permission and to  zone land for d ifferent uses, 
could be regarded as the "key urban policy" (McKay and Cox 1979), as it can 
fundamentally a ffec t population movements and patterns of public and private 
investm ent. Yet the motives which lie behind it have evolved on a somewhat 
piecem eal basis and planning objectives have often been form ulated only as 
problems have arisen. Therefore, a clearly defined set of reasons why the public 
sector should undertake to  make certain  land-use decisions is not subject to  a 
simple system atic presentation (Pearce e t al 1978). N evertheless, as the 
allocation of land is a product of actions taken in the public planning sector and 
the  private land m arket, it is essential to  establish a t least something of the 
rationale used to  legitim ise the actions of planners.
1.2 The objectives of the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act (the main features of 
which are still reflected  in the current powers available to  carry out land-use 
planning) have been described by Hall e t al (1973) as having th ree  main policy 
elem ents- urban containm ent, protection of rural land and the creation of self 
contained and balanced communities. To a tta in  these goals it is clear th a t the 
m arket in private land had, in some way, to  expect restrictions in its operation. 
The policies which, however, followed on from these objectives and the powers 
make available to  implement them , were strongly influenced by a pre-occupation 
with the achievm ent of physical standards, and lacked both social and economic 
components. Thus, initially a t least, the a tta inm ent of planning objectives was 
not necessarily perceived to  imply intervention in the workings of the land 
m arket to inhibit inefficiency (Pearce e t al 1978).
Today the situation is somewhat d ifferent. The planner is now more aware th a t 
his intervention for the purpose of regulating land-use carrys with it the 
corollary th a t this means both influencing the efficiency of the land m arket,and 
the  redistribution of real incomes. As a result it is now apparent th a t there  are
two "driving forces" justifying government intervention in the allocation of land: 
F irst there  is the search for efficiency, and second there  is the desire for g rea ter 
equity, or social justice, in the distribution of the products derived from land-use 
(Lichfield 1980).
In general,one of the strongest argum ents for a system of land-use planning> 
carried  out by the public sector, emphasises how the land m arket exhibits a 
number of distortions which cause an undesirable movement away from land and 
resource allocation efficiency. These inefficiencies are the result of what 
Pearce a t al (1978) describe as m arket im perfections and m arket failures. The 
form er is the result of distortions in the m arket itself, the la tte r  a distortion 
th a t em anates from outside of the m arket altogether. Some of the most 
im portant of these features which have been identified as being responsible‘for 
the  inefficient use of land are:
(1) Land is physically undepreciable and is not influenced by tim e, while the qualities 
of virtually all other commodities depreciates with tim e.
(2) Land is not transportable. Thus the concept of a national land m arket is a 
"particularly heroic idealisation of the reality" (Hyman and Markowski 1980).
(3) Land is lim ited in quantity; and its supply, though not com pletely inelastic (See 
2.5.),cannot be increased absolutely:
(4) Land is used not only for production but also as a long term  investm ent (See 2.6.):
(5) The commodity is not standardised and with the com parative lack of transactions 
the  establishm ent of a firm m arket price is difficult:
(6) The supply of buildings takes a long tim e to  adjust to  demand because they take 
tim e to  e rec t:
(7) The external e ffec ts  of a particular land-use may not be re flec ted  in the m arket 
price of the  plot:
o(8) Actions in response to m arket signals are slow because buyers and/or sellers lack 
m arket experience and information: ( Harrison 1977, Darin-Drabkin 1979, 
Lichfield 1979a).
1.3 These unique characteristics, it is argued, can lead to a perm anent disequilibrium 
in the land m arket between supply and demand. It has been a general willingness 
to  accept, and acknowledge, the very real difficulties posed by these 
im perfections which has provided, a t least in part, the rationale for some kind of 
land-use planning.
One way of responding to this need for public intervention is to accept the 
potential usefulness of the land m arket as an "indicator of citizen preferences in 
policy areas where the authority must make decisions" (Elkins 1974). The main 
purpose for intervention then becomes "the construction of a framework which 
induces the self-regulating m arket mechanism to achieve societal equilibrium" 
(R atcliffe 1976).
Under these conditions land would be perfectly  and rationally allocatable among 
competing users via coordinated supply and demand mechanisms. An agreem ent 
could be secured between buyers and sellers, a t a mutually satisfactory  price, by 
the process of bidding, which would also ensure th a t the quantity of land offered 
for sale equalled the quantity actually purchased. The resulting m arket 
equilibrium in a com petitive economy such as this will produce a P aretian  
optim al allocation of resources - one which can be altered  only by increasing the 
utility  of some individual a t the expense of the utility  of o thers (Nath 1973). In 
the light of these alleged "qualities of the theoretical model, and given the real 
internal logical coherence of the neo-classical paradigm it is scarcely surprising 
th a t it has given rise to a widespread if not doctrinaire belief in the finality and 
universality of the m arket mechanism" (Scott 1980).
The conclusion which is an almost inevitable result of this reasoning is th a t the 
proper role of planning is to remove as many as possible of the distortions which 
inhibit the operation of the land m arket, the basic objective being to  a tta in  "the 
same land-use pattern  th a t would have emerged naturally from the process of the 
urban real e s ta te  m arket under conditions of perfec t com petition" (Lichfield and 
Darin-Drabkin 1980).
This image of the beneficial perfect m arket "can be discerned without too much 
imagination in the writings of many social theorists and planning practioners" 
(Broadbent 1977). It has been a particularly pervasive influence on discussions 
surrounding the concept of rational planning.
The idea of rational planning has been traced  back, by Camhis (1979), to  the 
doctrine of free  com petition and individualism; the m arket rationality  taking 
"good care of all those things th a t social planning is now supposed to  do" (Camhis
1979). Although Lindblom (1973) and Etzioni (1973) la te r rejected  the 
'rationalistic tradition  in planning' as being a model which could not be applied in 
the real world it still remains in planning as an "ideal which must be pursued" 
(Solesbury 1974). Furtherm ore, in view of what Camhis (1979) has said, it is an 
ideal which can best be pursued through refining and improving the operation of 
the m arket - one area in which Meyerson (1973) has identified an im portant role 
for planning to  play.
The "Central Intelligence Function" which he allocates to  planning accepts th a t 
decision takers (like housebuilders) rarely have the right kind of accurate 
information to make a rational decision. Here the planner steps in to regularly 
check and in terp re t the local m arket situation and supply the appropriate body, 
or individual, with the necessary information. The planner thereby can "lubricate 
the process of urban development and achieve many of the main objectives of 
city planning by facilita ting intelligent individual actions"; planning through
"land-use and other controls" compensating "for the problems - the  failures - of 
the m arket" (Meyerson 1973).
This proposition rests on the idea th a t it is for the planner to  plan and the 
landowner or builder to implement. The key to successful planning lies in a 
readiness to  understand and co-operate with the land m arket, and community 
objectives are  achieved by directing ra ther than to tally  controlling the  m arket 
forces (McKie 1974).
In these circum stances the kind of activ ity  which planning should be carrying out 
involves giving landowners and builders all the relevant inform ation on demand 
for land, within the planned area, and the nature of the uses which a given plan 
will generate  and require. T hereafter, the planner takes into account the 
reactions of the private sector to  these proposals, and plans accordingly. By 
using this method planning hopes to  achieve its objectives through the 
establishm ent of general conditions to which all development must conform, but 
which within those conditions leaves decisions to  the individual owner or builder. 
In e ffec t the intention is "to make the m arket mechanism more effective" 
(Hayek 1960).
Of particu lar im portance to  this study is the way in which the  private 
housebuilders have,by and large, sought to  ensure th a t planning re s tric ts  itse lf to  
this kind of role. The aim of the private builders is to  make a profit on their 
activ ities and this implies th a t their response to  d ifferen t opportunities is 
determ ined by relative profitability and m arket demand. In the circum stances 
what they want from planning is a system which will allow them to  respond as 
efficiently  as possible to  this demand by eliminating some of the vagaries of the 
land m arket already outlined. Then, on completion of the project, some 
guarantee of "protection against excessive and incompatible activ ities" (Walshe 
1980) to  ensure tha t their product will have a good chance of being quickly sold.
One area  in which the housebuilders are particulary anxious for planning to  play 
an active role is in the provision of information. This is a result of the d istaste  
which most builders have, particularly the larger ones, for any uncertain tity  
regarding the future p a tte rn  of public investm ent in an area; especially 
investm ent in in frastructure .
Unless the housebuilder has both clear cut planning policies which clarify the 
likely fu ture prospects in an area, and regular contact with the planners on the 
more detailed aspects of these plans, then his ability "to assess accurately  the 
financial viability of a site  can be seriously impaired" (Craven 1970). This is an 
elem ent of risk which can make any decision arrived a t sub-optimal in term s of 
the potential profit which might be realised by a builder on a particular con tract.
Therefore, as the House-Builders Federation emphasised in their paper "Land For 
Housing", their view is th a t the planning system should have "the purpose of 
perm itting the m arket mechanism to allocate land, to  determ ine its ra te  of 
usage, and its price" (H.B.F. undated), functions they argue which the m arket can 
perform  b e tte r  than any adm inistrative machinery. The m easure of success for 
the planning process is how sensitive it is to the  demands of the m arket and how 
efficien tly  it allows these demands to  be m et (Baron 1980a).
So far the  explanation for land-use planning has been couched solely in term s of 
improving the efficiency of the m arket mechanism. The planner perform s only 
those tasks which will remove the hinderances th a t stand in the way of the 
e ffective  operation of the m arket. In the perform ance of these duties the work 
of the planner can be represented as a technical and politically neutral activ ity  
which is intended only to  produce a rational land-use p a tte rn  (Ambrose 1976a). 
This is a t least one aspect of the planning system which appears to  have the 
support of the housebuilders; however most, if not all planners, would argue th a t 
this is too lim ited and myopic a view to take, and th a t it ignores the wider 
consequences of some of the distortions outlined earlier.
In particu lar they point to  the fac t th a t even a "lubricated" land m arket will, by 
its  very nature, "consistently trigger off negative and disruptive land-use 
outcom es" (Scott 1980).
In the firs t place, although a specific land-use decision might appear rational to  
the individual decision maker it cannot reflec t the current, or indeed the future, 
"costs and benefits to those outside of th a t particu lar land transaction" (Lichfield 
1979a). In add ition ,the pattern  of land-use values which is determ ined by a 
m arket mechanism will ignore the needs of unprofitable,but socially desirable, 
uses of land such as schools and parks (Balchin and Kieve 1977). But perhaps 
most im portant of all is the way in which public intervention designed only to  
ease the  operation of m arket forces would ignore the second "driving force" in 
planning - equity.
In the  process of m arket bargaining the response of suppliers will depend upon 
the resources which the custom er can use in the negotiating process. However, 
as Harvey (1973) points out the resources which can be used in these 
negotiations, particulary money and wealth, are not divided equally among the 
potential custom ers. Where there is to be any weight a ttached  to the goal of 
equity, planning must .therefore,consider the implications of supporting a m arket 
process based upon the existing distribution of income and w ealth in society. 
Unless this factor is taken into account then m arket forces, which as Simmie 
(1974) notes contain hidden methods of regressive distribution, will "tend towards 
inequality in a situation where resources are scarce; and this applies most 
strongly to  land" (Eversley 1973).
On this evidence it is c lear th a t land-use planning must do more than simply ease 
the operation of the m arket. It must confront^ and ,if necessary, overrule the 
forces which operate in the m arket. The tools which have been made available 
to  land-use planners to  carry out this task are land allocation or zoning, which 
a ttem pts to  d irect private investm ent towards areas of need as opposed to  areas
where maximum profit can be realised; and developm ent control, which lim its 
the rights associated with the private ownership of land. The ex ten t to  which 
planning has, however, succeeded in diverting, or m itigating, the  e ffec ts  of the 
private land m arket to  the benefit of less privileged areas and people - as the 
goal of equity would d ic ta te  - is widely questioned. In fac t as Goodall (1972) 
points out "sim ilarites are more common than differences" between the patterns 
of land-use in a planned environment and those evolved via the m arket 
mechanism. While Hall e t al (1973) notes th a t the operation of land-use planning 
has seen the most fortunate get the most benefits while the least fo rtunate have 
gained very little . In the same way the machinery of developm ent control has 
been shown to  "reflect ra ther than modify the distribution of power, and 
therefore  land-use rights," its main purpose being to  control "trivial and 
aesthetic  judgements ra ther than the workings of the economy and society" 
(Simmie and Hale 1978). What explanation then can be offered for this apparent 
failure of land-use planning?
In view of what has already been said about the inherently regressive and 
unsatisfactory nature of the private land m arket it is clear th a t public 
intervention  ^ through land-use planning, in order to  achieve certain  goals, must in 
a mixed economy set itself against the prevailing m arket system .
It is inevitable th a t in so doing it will come up against, opposition from those who 
have most to  gain from the m arket system being le ft in tac t. Agents, such as 
housebuilders, who operate in the m arket can be expected to  resist any intervention 
by planners with the intention being to  minimise the e ffec ts  where they are likely 
to  impose costs. The m arket then is clearly not to  be ordered around (Foster 1973).
This conflict is the inevitable outcome of planning, with its emphasis on need and 
goal maximization, coming up against, for example, the private housebuilder 
m otivated by profit maximization and demand. If profits can be advanced, or the
worst e ffec ts  of any proposed policy on profits minimised, by exerting pressure on 
the planning system then resistance is alm ost guaranteed. In the circum stances it 
is hardly surprising th a t the communications betw een the two sectors, p rivate and 
public, take place in an atm osphere of mutual d istrust, the "public sector keeping a 
distance from but wanting to control the private sector, and the private sector 
continually seeking ways of getting around the controls" (Hambleton 1980).
This argum ent does not, however, offer a com pletely satisfacto ry  explanation for 
some of the disappointing results acheived by land-use planning. While it is clear 
planners should expect opposition to some of their policies why has the system 
failed to offer any effective  resistance to  these pressures when they have been 
applied by the private sector?
For Simmie (1974) the failure can be blamed on the planners them selves who have 
lacked the necessary vision, knowledge and will to  tackle the problem of ensuring a 
redistribution of resources.
In the same vein Eversley (1973) lambasts planners for failing to recognise their 
role as the "m aster - allocator" of resources, with a responsibility for ensuring 
g rea ter equality. This explanation, however, fails to take account of two further 
points.
F irst, as Pahl (1975) explains, 'gatekeepers' like the planners, may not in fac t have 
the kind of power and influence which would allow them to significantly a lte r the 
allocation of resources. The responsibility for the apparent failure of planners may 
lie a t a level of policy making and resource allocation which is beyond their 
responsibility and control. This would imply th a t "attacks a t the level of urban 
m anagement may be m isdirected" (Pahl 1975),and unproductive.
Second, a workman is only as good as his tools, and the tools which are available to 
carry out land-use planning display some basic weaknesses. The dominant featu re  
of the British land-use planning system , since 1953, has been the ex ten t to  which
"local authorities have lacked the power to d irect and im plem ent ra ther than 
merely draw up and regulate plans and development" (McKay and Cox 1979). As 
a result planning has been in p ractice  of a passive ra ther than an active nature. 
Local authorities must rely on the initiative and activ ities of o ther development 
agencies and particularly , in relation to  residential land programming, the 
response of private housebuilders. This is not the situation which was envisaged 
when the legislative framework for land-use planning was first established.
The 1947 Act "did not expect m arket forces to be very im portant in determining 
the  future growth of urban England" (Hall e t al 1973). Amendments to the 1947 
scheme, however, were introduced by the Conservatives in 1953/54 and 1959 to 
re-establish the private land m arket. When this was combined with a growing 
demand for owner-occupation (unexpectedly giving the private sector a larger 
role in the implemention of plans), and a post-war increase in the birth ra te  
(negating the s ta tic  population assumptions of the legislation) then the  whole 
developm ental context in which the 1947 scheme was intended to operate was 
to ta lly  distorted. The new planning structu res introduced in the 1971 and 1972 
Planning Acts, for England and Scotland respectively, did not accept th a t the 
existing powers available to  local authorities for land-use planning should be 
changed. Thus since 1947, particularly  in relation to a ttem pts  to  red irect private 
investm ent by housebuilders, "the planning system has faced a rapidly changing 
developm ental context with a struc tu re  devised to  accom m odate a development 
process which barely operated for th ree  years" (Hooper 1980). In particular, the 
resources to implement plans lie outside of the effective  control of planners and 
they have few, if any, means of imposing their will on agents operating in the 
private m arket (Broadbent 1977). But this is not the only problem planners have 
in trying to  control the actions of the private sector for redistributive ends.
As Foley (1973) has observed, the  objectives which have been pursued in land-use 
planning have, perforce, been defined almost solely in term s of an idealised 
spatial design and have concentrated  on the physical aspects of the plan. 
Physical and spatial goals have been assumed to  bring socio-economic benefits, 
or to  be desirable for their own sake without needing to  be fu rther justified 
(Harrison 1979).
Yet as Ambrose and Colenutt (1975) have shown this leaves the planner with no 
real power to  c rea te  social plans or implement social policy. This is a handicap 
which severely constrains the planner in any a ttem p t to  exert influence over the 
regressive forces operating in the  private m arket. The developer and builder has 
only to  justify his proposals in pure physical planning term s, the  general 
economic or social consequences of allowing a particular developm ent cannot be 
taken into account.
This am bivalent a ttitu d e  towards the m arket is reflec ted  in the scope allowed to 
planning policies. Development plans "shall be" s ta tem en ts setting  out proposals 
for the  use of land, but they only "have regard to" the  social and economic 
consequences of these spatial policies (H.M.S.O. 1972). The plans, therefore, 
have no explicit rem it to examine in detail e ither the distributional consequences, 
or the structural implications of their policies, in term s of m arket processes 
(Hooper 1980).
In view of what has been said above it becomes easier to  understand why land-use 
planning has found it d ifficult to  control the operation of m arket forces. The 
weaknesses in the planning system have encouraged developers to  regard the 
planning process as an obstacle to  be overcome ra ther than a framework of 
constraints and guidelines within which their decisions must be made. The 
exercise of development planning has been devalued by the failure to  take
account of the powers actually available to  implement policies and this has 
contributed to  a feeling th a t very little  output is being obtained from plan 
making for the input required (Lichfield 1979b).
So far, im plicit to  this examination of why land-use planning has had difficulties 
in controlling m arket forces, has been the assumption th a t the barriers to  
redistribution and equity are self-imposed by e ither planners or legislators. This 
assumption can be, and has been, challenged.
It can be argued th a t land-use planning in cap italist countries "always tends to  be 
concerned with the continued management of capitalism  and the containm ent of 
class demands" (McDougall 1979). The s ta te , in the form of land-use planning, 
only intervenes when the "autodestructive social and property relations of 
capitalism , as they make their way through the  land contingent process" (Scott
1980),threaten the continued operation of the cap italist system . This approach, 
however, fails to make allowances for the fac t th a t, on occasion, social reform s 
have been achieved through radical intervention in the m arket system . But worst 
of all it can only be seen as a philosophy of despair in which no potential is seen 
to  exist for change or improvement without dismantling the en tire  institutional 
framework - "the only appropriate action being to  throw stones or dismantle the 
s ta te"  (Broadbent 1977).
For any planner who is a t work today, trying perhaps to  achieve redistributive 
ends through the manipulation of agents who operate  in the private m arket, this 
is a theory which offers no prescription or framework for action. It tends, if 
anything,to  imply th a t the situation should be allowed to  deterio ra te  until such 
tim e as "revolution" becomes inevitable. This, as Broadbent (1977) goes on to  
point out, is simply throwing away all the possibilities and potential of existing 
institutions such as planning. Therefore, it is necessary to  consider some
alte rnative  conclusions which are both practical and action orientated .
The above evidence has illustrated how planning can play two quite d ifferen t and 
contrasting roles in its dealings with m arket forces. F irst, planning can be 
identified as the means for removing the distortions which inhibit the operation 
of m arket forces. In this role the planner a ttem p ts  to  make the land m arket 
operate  more efficiently , the implicit assumption being th a t more than just 
economic benefits can be derived from the operation of a perfect m arket. This 
is an area  where the housebuilders in particular are happy to  see planning play an 
im portant part.
If planning, however, has any ambition to  achieve those goals which are 
concerned with equity then it is clear tha t m arket forces must be challenged and 
resisted. This is the second role which planning can play, but in carrying out this 
task planning must an ticipate, and be prepared for, opposition. The planners 
m u s t, th e re fo re , ensure th a t their reason for intervention is sound, their 
justification for intervention is defensible, their analysis of prevailing m arket 
conditions is accurate  and, above all, th a t their policy is capable of being 
implemented. If it is clear tha t a plan cannot be im plem ented, and it does not 
m eet all these c rite ria , then it will be ignored by the very people th a t it was 
m eant to influence.
The means, however, which are available to  carry out this 'action o rien ta ted1 
land-use planning have been shown to  be deficient in a number of respects but 
"this does not justify the jettisoning of physical planning" or local authority 
development planning (Pickvance 1977). Jowell (1977) has illustrated  how the 
powers which are presently available can be used as effective  instrum ents for 
both achieving social policies and perm itting positive planning "where the 
authority directs the use and development of land instead of simply reacting to 
m arket forces" (Jowell 1977).
The im plication is th a t genuine and worthwhile results can be realised when and 
where the  e ffo rt is made.
This chapter has shown th a t while the control of m arket forces may not be an 
easy job for land-use planning, it is both a necessary and feasible goal to  aim for. 
The question is though, how effective  has planning been in its response to this 
challenge? One area, as already indicated above (1.4.), in which it is possible to  
examine some of the more practical aspects of this confrontation is in the 
allocation of land for private housebuilding. This is an arena where the conflict 
betw een land-use planning and m arket forces is particularly  visible, and this has 
been very much the case for West C entral Scotland in recen t years.
In consideration of this, and in order to  provide a firm foundation for a la te r 
discussion of private housebuilding in this area, the following chapter goes on to  
examine how the unique features of both the housebuilding industry and the land 
m arke t,crea te  special problems for the planning process. It is, however, against 
the theoretical background set out in this chapter th a t any la te r questions must 
be considered, and subsequently answered.
CHAPTER TWO
THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE HOUSEBUILDING AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR
LAND-USE PLANNING.
L. J.
2.1 One of the  most im portant elem ents in the process of house construction is the 
availability of land, and as such it is a focus of concern to  all those with an 
involvement in housebuilding. In the past any conflicts over the question of land 
availability for private housing in Scotland have been com paratively muted, and 
"as a source of friction between builders and local planning authorities it appears 
to  have been much less acute than in England and Wales" (Gaskin 1977). This 
situation, however, was almost transform ed in the  space of a year by the 
publication in 1978 of the Lothian Region S tructure Plan, followed a year la te r 
by S trathclyde’s S tructure Plan (Lothian Region 1978a, S trathclyde Region 1979). 
In both these cases the policies which dealt with residential land allocation were 
an im m ediate source of considerable, and a t tim es, rancorous dispute*, but before 
exploring in more detail the background to , and progess of, events in Strathclyde 
it is neccessary to  spend some tim e considering the economics of both the land- 
m arket, and the housebuilding industry. A number of the most im portant 
featu res of the land availability process depend, a t least in part, upon the way in 
which these particular economic circum stances influence the decisions of both 
planners and builders.
2.2 In any consideration of the land question, particularly  as it a ffects  private 
housebuilders, one of the most im portant fea tu res which has to  be recognised is 
"the ex ten t to which their actions and opportunities are demand determ ined" 
(D epartm ent of the Environment 1975). In all the interviews carried out with the 
private builders this aspect of their work was consistently emphasised. The 
builders in question were in fac t all operating in th a t part of the m arket which
concentrates on speculative building for sale. As a result it was not only the 
level of actual and current demand which they identified as im portant, but also 
the industry's expectation of fu ture demand.
The demand facto r which has,till now, been alm ost exclusively linked with any 
fluctuation in the activ ity  of private housebuilders is the variation in the su 
of mortgages. The conclusion seemed to  be th a t "the most im portant single 
variable which determ ined the activ ities of the private housebuilder was the 
number of m ortgage advances being made by building societies" (Wilkinson and 
Archer 1976). The evidence from figure 2.1. would appear to  confirm this. The 
ability of building societies to  grant m ortgages is measured by the net inflow of 
funds and, allowing for a tim e lag in the response from builders, the peaks and 
troughs in housing s ta rts  shadow the fluctuating fortunes of the societies. The 
housebuilders, however, revealed them selves to  be less satisfied now with th a t 
explanation than they might have been two to  th ree years ago.
As table 2.1. clearly indicates every housebuilder interviewed, bar one, failed in 
1980 by a significant proportion to  m eet the ta rg e t which they had set 
them selves for house sales. However, all the  private builders who were interviewed
House Sales
Builders Projected Actual
A 250 170
B 500 523
C 450 380
D 400 340
E 500 420
F 350 240
G "20 per cent down"
Table 2.1.

declared quite unequivocally th a t during this same period a significant proportion 
of their quota mortgages, allocated to  them  by building societies, had gone 
unused. The building societies them selves, while they had some difficulty in 
maintaining a satisfactory  intake of funds, had not experienced difficulties on 
anything like the scale observable in the building industry. In fa c t,th e  general 
m anager of one of the largest building societies was able to  assert th a t even if 
queues for m ortgages did exist they did not last any longer than the tim e taken 
to  sort out the details of a house transaction (Guardian 1980a). In a similar vein 
the  d irector of the House Builders Federation, Roger Humber, described the 
question of m ortgage availability as having nothing to do with the decline in 
p rivate sector housebuilding (Sunday Times 1980).
In these circum stances the explanation for the recent decline in private 
housebuilding appears to  lie less in the ability or inability of potential custom ers 
to  obtain mortgages, and more in their willingness or capacity  to  take on the 
monthly repaym ents. This conclusion is fu rther confirmed when the nature of 
the  decline in housing output is considered.
The situation was described by one builder as being one in which "the first tim e 
buyer m arket has proved to  be the most resiliant; the worst e ffec t of the decline 
has been fe lt in the middle part of our range." This was a view to  which all the 
builders subscribed. In every case the sector of the m arket which had 
experienced the most severe decline, proportionately,w as the middle part (prices 
around £30,000). The first tim e buyer m arket had help up relatively well,and up 
m arket houses (prices over £35,000) had continued to  sell. The people then who 
had shown the most propensity to  postpone the decision to  buy were probably 
those in a position to  consider perhaps their firs t 'trade-up' move. This decline in 
the number of people moving from one house to  another, in a b e tte r area or 
condition, was also identified by the Building Societies Association as being an \
im portant fea ture  of the  housing m arket in 1980 (Guardian 1980b). The evidence 
above would suggest th a t for the individual purchaser the decision not to  buy has 
turned, not so much on the availability of a m ortgage, but on uncertain tity  over 
fu ture household finance - in attem pting then to  explain the current status of 
private housebuilding, consideration must be given to  an even wider array of 
economic factors than simply the supply of mortgages.
The im portance of this conclusion lies in the even g rea ter emphasis it places
upon the influence which broad, macro-economic policy, institu ted  by central 
government, can have on the housing m arket in general, and private builders in
particular; the outcome often being unintentional and unforeseen. Now, more
than ever, it is the case "that the chief im pacts on the (private) housing sector
have been the side e ffects  of broad policies aimed a t reducing inflation" (Bassett
and Short 1980). -
The im plications of this for the land-use planning process are of some 
considerable im portance. If, as we have seen, the actions, and so the land 
requirem ents, of private house-builders are largely if not wholly determ ined by 
centrally  directed economic policy, then this is a fac to r over which the local 
authority  planner has no control or influence. Faced with the task of allocating 
and programming future land requirem ents a planner, using the best available 
inform ation, can find any scheme made redundant, almost overnight, by a 
decision to cut the minimum lending ra te  by 4 per cent. While it might be argued 
th a t all the elem ents of a plan are subject to  the same kinds of influence, the 
position in regard to residential land allocation is of particular im portance. This 
is because in most structure  plans, and particularly in the case of Strathclyde and 
Lothian, the policies concerned with land allocation were m eant to  play a 
cen tral, if not crucial role, in the a ttem pts to  actually implement the chosen 
stra teg ies.
The way in which planning has been influenced by this situation will be 
considered la ter,bu t a t this point it is im portant to  bear in mind the way in which 
planning would appear to  stand rem ote from the  'principia media* (Friedmann 
1973) which influence private housebuilders, yet a t the same tim e a ttem pts to  
control the ir activ ities.
It is im portant, however, to  emphasise a t the same tim e th a t it is not only on 
economic but also on social and political grounds th a t politicians and others have 
varied in their approach to  owner occupation -  and so private housebuilders. 
While the  private sector is currently  faced with a difficult situation it should not 
be forgo tten  th a t in the past Conservative policies have usually favoured "profits 
for the private developer and builders", with those in terests able to  maximise 
their role in the land and property m arket when Conservative governments have 
attem p ted  to  implement free m arket policies (McKay and Cox 1979). The 
situation a t present is one in which the housebuilders find them selves, in the 
words of the  past - president of the Housebuilders Federation, "for the first tim e 
in many years entirely in step with the objectives of the Government of the day" J 
(Latham 1979/80). In the circum stances one might expect this shared sense of 
purpose to  have played an im portant part in shaping some featu res of the land 
availability conflict both in Strathclyde and other parts of the country. It is also 
possible to  envisage th a t in view of the lim ited influence which planning 
authorities have on the major economic aspects of housebuilding th a t social and 
political pressures, exercised locally, will a ttem p t to  influence the process of 
residential land allocation, albeit within a narrowly defined economic framework. 
But before going on to  consider some of these aspects of the land question it is 
neccessary to  return to  an investigation of the economics of housebuilding, this 
tim e with particular reference to  the land m arket.
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2k  The way in which prices are determ ined in the residential land m arket is perhaps 
the most im portant side-effect of the demand influences outlined above.
As D rew ett (1973) noted in his examination of private housebuilders most bid 
prices for sites are arrived a t by the residual method. This was confirmed, 
without contradiction, by all the house-builders interviewed in this study. By this 
method the bid price for a piece of land is calculated "by deducting the costs of 
development, plus profit, from the price which the m arket is prepared to  pay for 
the com pleted houses" (Howell 1972). The demand for land then is a derived
i
demand, the amount a purchaser can offer depending upon the price consumers /
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are prepared to  pay for the product th a t is to  be provided by th a t land; and this 
price, as we have seen above, is itself frequently the product of policies aimed a t 
ta rg e ts  other than housing. N evertheless,the form which this demand for land 
does take, plays an im portant part in determ ining the p a tte rn  of building 
activ ities and land prices.
The most im portant features of this process, and its implications for planning, 
are best revealed during a period of suddenly increased demand. With the help of 
some figures arrived a t through inform ation supplied by the Scottish 
Development Departm ent it is possible to  illustrate,during such a period, some of 
the most pertinent aspects of this relationship between housebuilders and the 
land m arket.
The potential supply of housing in the owner-occupied secto r consists of the 
stock of existing houses, plus new ones under construction for sale. The la tte r , 
although they make up on average only 2-2 j%  per cent, per annum of the housing 
stock make a much greater contribution to  supply than this might suggest. This 
is because not every owner-occupied house is bought and sold every year. 
Estim ates do, however, vary of the exact contribution th a t new houses make 
towards the to ta l number sold in a year.
Pearce e t al (1978) calculated a figure of 20 per cent while Charles (1977) quotes 
a figure of 40-50 per cent. In Scotland in general, and West C entral Scotland in 
particu lar, where the level of owner occupation has been consistently lower than 
elsewhere in Britian the available stock of "second-hand" houses will inevitably 
be small. In such circum stances it seems likely th a t the contribution which new 
homes make to  the to ta l number sold will be towards the higher end of these 
estim ates. As a result any significant increase in demand will put considerable 
pressure on the capacity of the area's building industry. As table 2.2. shows such 
an increase in demand took place between the middle 1960's and the early to 
middle 1970's.
Number of privately built new houses com pleted in West C entral Scotland
Year 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Total 3542 2886 2851 2718 3147 3620 3171 4820 4923 5323 5216
Table 2.2. Source: S.D.D. (1975)
The explanation for this lay in a combination of "rising rents for public sector 
tenancies, the growth of personal disposable incomes, and ample building society 
funds" (National Economic Development O ffice 1976), and as figure 2.2. 
illustrates, this was matched by a substantial rise in the price of houses in 
Scotland. It is in such circum stances th a t the producers of housing explain the
Annual Average Scottish House Prices 1968-74 (1968 = 100)
And R etail Price Index
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Fig 22. Source: S.D.D. (1980)
high level of house prices by blaming the high cost of land. An analysis of table 
2 .3 . reveals, however, th a t the proportion of the house price taken up by land
Average Plot Prices* in West C entral Scotland as a Percentage of the 
Average Scottish House Price
Year 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Per Cent 3 .5 2 .5 3 .5 3.1 3 .2 4.1 3.1 3.5 3 .8 3 .6 3.3
Table 2.3. Source: S.D.D. 1980
costs remained steady throughout the boom period. In e ffec t then, house prices 
rose rapidly as the supply coming onto the m arket could not be increased quickly 
enough, because of constraints internal to  the building industry. This m eant tha t 
the price of those houses which were available could be increased, by the 
builders, to  a level a t which the number of purchasers, able and willing to  afford 
them , was reduced to  the number of houses available.
*This excludes prices paid in Glasgow where the very small number of 
transactions randomly distorts the figures.
Thus in the period 1972 - 74 house prices rose by nearly 60 per cent in Scotland, 
while during the same period land prices in the C entral Belt increased by about 
40 per cent. This compares with a 25 per cent increase in the re ta il price index 
over the same period.
While it might be argued th a t this is a unique and perhaps unrepresentative case, 
the point which it cogently illustrates is the ex ten t to  which house prices can 
rapidly, and quite substantially increase in a manner which is not directly related  
to  trends in land prices. In addition,this case illu stra tes  how the builders would 
have been able to  substantially improve their bid prices for residential land. The 
increased selling price for new and com pleted houses would allow them more 
leeway in calculating how much they could afford to  pay for a piece of land. In 
these circum stances the price of land could then be bid up to  a new, higher level. 
All this points to  the conclusion th a t new houses are not expensive because land 
costs are high but ra ther th a t house prices, forced up by an increase in demand 
acting against a relatively inelastic supply, can drag land prices up behind them 
(Ambrose 1976b).
In the  circum stances it would seem reasonable to  assume, as many planners have, 
th a t to  simply release additional residential land will "not make a ha* porth of 
d ifference to  the level of house prices" (Senior 1972). While such argum ents 
rem ain substantially true they should n o t be taken to  imply, as has sometimes 
been the  case, th a t the land release policies of planners will have no im pact on 
house prices. It is clear from the above evidence th a t the short term  e ffec t on 
house prices of any release of residential land will be negligible. It is, however, 
equally clear th a t the capacity  of the private sector to  respond to  an increase in 
demand will in part be determ ined by the  amount of land which has already 
passed through the planning system and can be made available, almost 
im m ediately, to  the housebuilders.
It is the capacity  of the planning system to  carry out a programme of land 
allocation and release such th a t the resources are  available in both the  right 
place and a t the right tim e, th a t the builders question. The private sector 
argum ent, most enthusiastically prosecuted by Tom Baron of Christian Salvesen, 
is th a t the s truc tu re  plan system has grossly underestim ated the potential fu ture 
demand for private housing land, and th a t it operates in a manner which is both 
inflexible and unresponsive to  any change in circum stances (Baron 1980a).
The most im portant point to  emphasise here, however, is the ex ten t to  which 
prices in the residential land m arket are determ ined by forces,once again outside 
the control of planning authorities, which influence in the firs t instance the 
demand for houses. Therefore, even if a local authority was able to  accurately  
fo recast fu ture house requirem ents and so a llocate land, in the right place and a t 
the right tim e ,to  m eet th a t dem and,the programme could still founder due to  an 
inability to  effectively  intervene in the land m arket. In e ffec t "fluctuations in 
the m arket price of land are beyond the ir powers of influence" (Groves 1980), and 
this inability to  influence the price of land is particularly  im portant in the  e ffec t 
it has on the  decision by a landowner whether or not to  allow his land to  come 
forward for development.
For any landowner there  will be a supply price below which he will be unwilling 
to  sell. In a m arket which is characterised  by rising values or even, as Neuburger 
and Nichol (1976) conclude, simply "the expectation of future (higher) prices",the 
owner will try  to  obtain the best possible price for his land by keeping it off the 
m arket until the amount offered reaches a satisfactory  level. In contrast, a 
substantial downturn in the land m arket is, as Hyman and Markowski (1980) 
illustra ted , accompanied by a considerably g rea ter fall in the  number of
transactions; the  owners postponing the  decision to  sell until it is possible to 
make a satisfactory  return on their asset. This power of the landowner to  refuse 
the  best offer th a t the m arket can make has two im portant implications for 
planning.
F irst there  is the e ffec t it has on a ttem p ts  to  tax be tterm en t values; although 
the Property Advisory Group fe lt able to  point out th a t "the principle of taxing 
development gain is no longer an issue and the ra te  of Development Land Tax is 
a t a  level which is generally acceptable" (D epartm ent of the Environment 1930); 
it seems clear th a t landowners may be re luctan t to  bring land onto the m arket 
due to their perceptions of the im pact of the tax (B arrett e t al 1978a). The 
ex ten t to  which the tax is a genuine d e terren t to land release is unclear (Rose 
1973, N eutze 1974, Foster and G laister 1975) but there  are indications th a t 
owners nevertheless perceive the tax to be a major disincentive. This is despite 
the fac t th a t "some a t least are not liable to  pay it or would have paid more 
under previous arrangem ents" (B arrett e t  al 1978b). The landowner then can 
choose e ither, not to  make his land available for developm ent, or to  wait until 
the price, net of tax, is th a t which he would have originally accepted. The 
planner then is faced with a situation in which the two objectives of recouping 
for the community any increase in land values, and a t the same tim e ensuring a 
supply of development land,are mutually antagonistic. His im potence in the face 
of the major forces which shape the residential land m arket compounding his 
difficulty.
The second problem for planning is the  way in which the nature and purpose of 
landownership can influence the likelihood of a piece of land coming forward for 
development, with different owners having d ifferent supply prices.
If,fo r exam ple,a piece of land is held as a speculative investm ent,then, during a 
period of increased demand for housing, the owner can expect higher prices
tomorrow than he is likely to  get today,as the higher house prices feed through to  
the land m arket. If this optimism is shared by a number of owners then they will 
hold back from selling their land; their psychic selling price having been 
increased. If sufficient owners hold out for higher prices then they will observe 
th a t prices do in fac t increase. This bolsters the  sellers ' view of the fu ture even 
more "and higher and higher prices are asked, and the process goes on until the 
bubble breaks" (Schmid 1970).
In a sim ilar fashion a person who owns a particu lar property with development 
potential may continue to  hold th a t property, w hatever the price offered, 
because he considers the developm ent would be detrim ental to  am enities 
currently  enjoyed. Work done by Kaiser and Weiss (1970) h a s ,fo r  instance, 
dem onstrated th a t the price which will induce an owner to part with his land will 
re flec t how long the person has owned it and w hether or not he or she uses it.
Analogous to  this is the situation where a builder may hold land adjacent to  a 
com pleted development with the in tention of expanding on to  it. The firm , for 
financial reasons of its own, may however decide to  restra in  development on the 
site  while nevertheless retaining the wish to  eventually make use of it. In the 
circum stances the selling price likely to  induce the  firm  to  part with the  land 
will be well in excess of the real value of the site ; therefo re  a  potentially useable 
site  might go undeveloped.
The planner in the above circum stances is placed in a position where the 
allocation of land for residential developm ent simply does not guarantee th a t the 
sites can be made available a t a p rice  which is com patible to both sides in the 
bargain. At the same tim e, outside of the circum scribed and expensive powers of 
Compulsory Purchase, there  is no way in which he can actively and purposely 
intervene in the process; an im portan t lim itation bearing in mind th a t ownership 
problems have been identified as one of "the most severe constraints on the
prospects of future (housing) developm ents” (D epartm ent of the Environment 
1978).
From the  above description of some of the details of the residential land m arket 
it has been possible to  illustra te  how the  price offered for housing land re flec ts, 
above all, the existing demand for housing, a fac to r identified in 1.2 as being 
outside the control of planning authorities. At the same tim e, the power of a 
landowner to  refuse any offer th a t the m arket can make for his land,illustrates 
how the supply of residential land is subject to  influences over and above those of 
'rational economics'.
In the circum stances this analysis suggests th a t m arket forces, however 
distorted, will play the leading role in postponing or bringing forward land for 
development, irrespective of the land allocation policies pursued by planners; 
The veracity  of this conclusion will be tested  la te r, but first we consider how 
transactions are actually carried out in the residential land m arket and the 
additional problems this creates.
One of the most interesting features of the residential land m arket is the way in 
which many transactions, especially those involving greenfield sites, are  not 
outright purchases but the granting of options or conditional contracts. These 
guarantee the owner a sum approaching the development value of his land if the 
option is exercised or the con tract becomes unconditional.
Such an event will occur if planning consent in obtained by the person taking out 
the option or conditional con tract (Pearce e t al 1978). The advantage of this 
method of purchase lies not only in the  cash saving, but in the fac t th a t a small 
amount of cash is tied up in relation to  the final value of the land purchased.
The extent to  which developers use this method of land purchase varies 
considerably. The D epartm ent of the Environment (1975) found th a t the norm
among developers in the South-East was 20 to  50 per cent with some holding as 
much as 80 per cent of their land in this way. Of the builders interviewed in this 
study none were willing, or able, to  give precise figures, however, only two were 
involved in the outright purchase of long term  speculative or "sleeper land". One 
other builder did buy land without planning permission but only in circum stances 
where there  was a very strong possibility of approval being granted in the near 
fu ture. The other firms either used options or only bought land, som etim es from 
other builders, which already had planning permission. In the circum stances, as 
Bather (1976) also noted, the fac to r which appears to  be of param ount 
im portance in influencing the decision whether or not to  buy residential land is 
the  im m ediate availability, or strong likelihood, of obtaining planning permission. 
This suggests th a t there are very few transactions involving land with long term  
development potential, and the explanation for this can be found in the motives 
of both buyers and sellers.
In the la tte r  case most landowners do not sell their land until it has a real 
prospect of planning permission being granted as it is not until then tha t they will 
receive the whole development value of their land. For the builder the purchase 
of long term  development land would involve holding charges, pending planning 
permission, and the opportunity cost of tying up valuable capital in such 
speculative purchases is considered to  be too high (Goldberg and Ulinden 1976).
The end result of this p rac tice  is one sm aller m arket in speculative land with no, 
or very little ,im m ed ia te  prospect o f development taking place, and another 
larger m arket in sites either with planning consent, or virtually certain  to  obtain 
it in the near fu ture (Drew ett 1973).
This division of the land m arket into two distinct sectors is mirrored in the 
d ifferent a ttitudes adopted by builders towards their land holdings. In one case 
the land is trea ted  as a straightforw ard input to  the development process, the
ownership of the land being essential because it is a condition of production. In 
con trast the purchase of land in which there  is an elem ent of speculation implies 
a view of land which emphasises its value as an investm ent good, carrying with it 
the  possibility of realising, from it alone, a substantial profit (Massey and 
C atalano 1978).
Although much of the evidence which is available indicates th a t this la tte r  
approach is not as common as one might e x p e c t ,i t  has been argued th a t 
housebuilders are becoming "increasingly dependent upon landownership for the 
financing of their productive activ ities" (Hooper 1980). This is because 
productivity in the housebuilding industry has increased a t a much slower ra te  
than in other sectors of industry producing low profit margins from production 
per se, and thus increasing the a ttrac tio n s  of speculation in land (Ball 1978). If 
this were to  be the case then it suggests th a t land allocation programmes would 
become even more difficult to  im plem ent. The builders might be unwilling to 
make use of land which they owned, and had been allocated for housing, until 
such tim e as the financial returns on the land part of the operations repaid their 
initial investm ent; in the circum stances there  would be very little  which 
planning could do to  speed up the process of housebuilding.
While the  above section contem plated the  likelihood of land being purchased 
speculatively ,it is clear th a t the only firm s with the means to  do this will be 
those with sufficient internal sources of finance to  fund such operations. These 
are  likely to  be large firms with good financial contacts and operating in diverse 
fields of activity . This, however, is only one aspect of the way in which the 
s tructu re  of the industry can a ffec t its operations, and it is this aspect of its 
economics which will now be considered.
The agents involved in the actual construction of housing are builders and 
developers. In p ractice, although a distinction can be drawn between the two 
(the builder constructs housing, the developer assembles land, finances
construction etc), the division has become less c lear as the larger construction 
companies have broadened their ac tiv ities to  include all the functions formerly 
associated with the developer. N evertheless, the industry continues to  be 
characterised by a variety  of types of firm which differ in their modes of 
operation and in the constraints they experience. The criterion most commonly 
used as a basis for the classification of building firms is their size
(Harloe e t al 1974, Balchin and Kieve 1977, Basset and Short 1980). As Craven
(1969) points out, however, a firms "attitude  to  growth" also plays an im portant 
part in influencing its behaviour, and as all the firm s involved in this study were
either medium or large sized builders it  was this facto r, above all, which
accounted for differences in behaviour.
All of the firm s interviewed had access to  sim ilar sources of finance. Short term  
loans were obtained from the clearing banks, secured against the overall business 
reputation of the firm , the in terest charges being to  5 per cent above base 
ra te . The builders also had the usual overdraft facilities on which to  m eet 
recurring expenditures and, as all these companies were part of a larger group, 
the holding company, or another member of the group, were further sources of 
finance, the loan usually being granted a t a ra te  of in terest 1{ to  2 per cent 
above base ra te . The factor, however, which above all influenced their mode of 
operation was the degree to  which they relied on share capital raised in the City 
to  finance parts of their work. To raise money this way public companies need to 
be continually expanding their operations and keeping their profits up, and if 
their investors confidence is not to  be undermined the firm must present an 
image of growth and prosperity.
Where firms rely on this means of finance, then in order to  maintain dividend 
repaym ents, a high turnover and an increase in profits, it implies mass designed 
housing on large sites; with a requirem ent th a t a minimum number of houses be
built, and sold, to  m eet fixed operating costs. This can contrast quite sharply with 
other firms where the pressures are less intense, and where rapid turnover is less 
im portant than the maximum ra te  of return  on any one project. In these companies 
the drive for growth is a less im portant fea tu re  of their style of operation and, 
even though they may be building the same number of houses as a growth m otivated 
builder, the differences between them remain substantial.
Thus the structu re  of the industry, in particu lar the a ttitu d e  of companies 
operating in any one area to  the need for growth, will c rea te  d ifferent pressures for 
the  planning system. The ex ten t to  which this fac to r has been an influence on the 
way the conflict surrounding land allocation has evolved in the Strathclyde area, 
particularly  around Glasgow, will be considered la ter.
The purpose of this chapter has been to  elucidate the way in which the economics 
of housebuilding impinges, a t a number of points, on the very planning system which 
seeks to  influence the industry's behaviour. A number of the most im portant 
influences on the builders, it has been suggested, lie outside of the im m ediate 
control of planners; and in the context of a dominant private m arket in land the 
planning authority would appear to  have only a lim ited opportunity to  ensure tha t 
land really is ready for development, or to  programme effectively  its future 
availability. The problems involve the interplay between m arket circum stances, 
fiscal policy, and the motives of both owners - regarding the holding of land, and 
builders - regarding their financial objectives.
The discussion has also emphasised the  ex ten t to  which planning in a mixed 
economy must recognise the role of the m arket and allow for the fac t th a t public 
intervention, when it occurs, must be such as to  preserve profitability  - otherwise 
development can come to  a halt (Broadbent 1977). This is a conclusion which 
implies tha t in order for local authorities to  achieve some of their objectives they 
may have to  c rea te  conditions which are a ttra c tiv e  to  private development. The 
implications which this form of co-operative action can have for the planning
process will be considered la ter, as it clearly implies concessions being made by one 
side in a bargain to the benefit of the other.
In chapter one it was pointed out th a t while land-use planning must challenge the 
apparent logic of the m arket process it would find it d ifficult to  do so effectively . 
This chapter has gone on from there  to  emphasise what might be some of the very 
real and practical problems confronting any a ttem p t to  influence both the actions 
of private housebuilders, and the behaviour of the land m arket. The evidence has 
shown th a t in some cases planning could find itse lf rem ote from the im portant 
levers of control, and indeed both planners and housebuilders were, on occasion, 
shown to be potentially vulnerable to  external forces operating on a broader front. 
So far, however, it is only the potential e ffec t of some of the above factors which 
has been considered. A number of questions remain unanswered relating to  the way 
in which these different forces operating either individually, or in concert, really 
do influence events. It is therefore to  a practical consideration of these m atters 
th a t a tten tion  must now be turned.
CHAPTER THREE
PRIVATE HOUSEBUILDING IN WEST CENTRAL SCOTLAND
SECTION ONE: The Market Context
SECTION TWO: The private housebuilder
and the Strathclyde S tructure 
Plan
The kind of difficulties which land-use planning might encounter when 
attem pting to  achieve its objectives through the manipulation of m arket forces 
have, until now, been considered either in abstrac t, or on a com paratively broad 
scale. The next step therefore , is to  examine how this conflict can develop in a 
particular case, and how the interplay between the  actors who take part in the 
process can a ffec t the way in which events unfold. In view of this the present 
chapter first considers, in section one, how the evolution of m arket forces, which 
characterise private housebuilding in the Glasgow area, have created  both 
problems and opportunities for land-use planning. This provides an essential 
background against which it is possible to  develop an understanding of the 
developmental,, context wherein more recent events have taken place.
This review of the prevailing situation also provides a basis for the la te r 
examination, in section two, of the residential land policies contained in 
Strathclyde's S tructure Plan. In particular how these policies were affected  by 
the m arket forces which operate in this sphere. The way in which certain  
historical and contem porary factors have influenced the final shape of these 
policies., can be used as a model against which to  te s t some of the questions 
outlined in chapters one and two.
Section One
An early fea tu re  of housing in the Clydeside conurbation - even before the 
Second World War - was the way in which Glasgow Corporation discouraged 
private housebuilders from operating in the city.
The emphasis which had been put on local authority  housing from the 1919 Housing 
Act onwards was even further reinforced by the Labour party  gaining control of the 
Corporation in 1933.
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The result of this was, th a t although "between 1919 and 1939, 76,630 houses were 
authorised to  be built in the city" only "9106 or 12 per cent were privately built, 
a much lower proportion than in most English c ities a t this tim e" (Randall 1980). 
The private housebuilders were found ^therefore, even before the Second World 
War, to  be concentrating their activ ities on a few areas a t the edge of the city 
where land could be more readily obtained. This was a p a tte rn  repeated  in many 
of the industrial burghs throughout Clydeside where "most of the relatively low 
level of private housebuilding which did take place was concentrated  in the 
county areas on the periphery of Glasgow" (Randall 1980).
This early momentum continued to  direct events in the im m ediate post-w ar years 
and by 1951 a very clear split could be observed in the region's housing pattern . 
The private housebuilding which did take place in the  Glasgow area was now 
concentrated  in only a few contiguous, residential suburbs: To the north-w est of 
the city  there  was Bearsden and Milngavie, in the north Bishopbriggs and, on the 
south side, Giffnock through to  Newton Mearns. (These are now areas covered by 
Bearsden and Milngavie, Strathkelvin and Eastwood D istrict Councils 
respectively). Most of the development which has taken place since then has 
continued to  emphasise this dichotomy.
Between 1951 and 1961 nearly 1250 ha. of residential land were developed in the 
im m ediate Glasgow area.
The 761 ha. of this which lay within the  city , most of it a t four main sites - 
Drumchapel, Easterhouse, Nitshill and Castlem ilk, was used almost entirely  for 
high density local authority houses. In con trast, of the remaining 485 ha outside 
the city , only 73 ha, a t Clydebank, was used for local authority houses. The
residue was almost entirely developed as low density private housing in Bearsden 
and Milngavie, Bishopbriggs and Newton Mearns (Table 3.1.).
P art of the explanation for this lies in the mutually antagonistic pressures under 
which the city  had to operate a t this tim e.
Extension of Glasgow's Imm ediate Periphery
Additions to  built-up land (ha)
1951-1961 1961-71 1971-76
Glasgow D istrict 761 230 122
Clydebank 73 49 5
Bearsden/Milngavie 155 145 47
Bishopbriggs 122 111 64
Thornliebank/ 
Newton Mearns 135 72 26
Total 1246 607 264
Table 3.1. Source: Adapted from Lea (1980)
On the one hand, they had to reduce to a more acceptable level the intolerably 
high residential densities in some of the ciy's worst slum areas. To accom odate 
the people displaced during this process, additional land for housing had to  be 
found elsewhere. On the other hand, Abercrombie's Clyde Valley Plan had
proposed a greenbelt for Glasgow, and this involved "taking up land within the 
boundaries of the city 11 (Checkland 1976). Thus a t the same tim e as more land 
was required for housing, the potential supply was being put under pressure.
One solution to  this problem was overspill and, throughout the 1950's, there  was a 
relatively continuous flow of people leaving the city . Between 1951 and 1961 
Glasgows population fell by over 175,000. This, however, was not enough to  solve 
the city's problems and the Corporation was under intense pressure to  fill the 
gaps in the city 's housing supply* which were becoming more and more obvious. 
The councillors themselves "were profoundly conscious of the pressure of the 
house waiting list, variously estim ated in the  early 1950's as 80,000 -  90,000 
families" (Checkland 1976). At the same tim e, however, it is possible to  d e tec t 
an undercurrent of opinion, amongst these same councillors, th a t overspill was 
not the only,or* indeed the best,solution to  the city 's housing problem.
The 'Bruce Plan', produced by the c ity  engineer had argued, in con trast to 
Abercrombie's P la n ,th a t it was possible to  rehouse the whole of Glasgow's 
population, a t acceptable densities, within the city  boundary. As Randall (1980) 
points out, this report impressed the c ity  council; and although by the early to 
mid 50's they had reluctantly  accepted the  need for a large overspill programme, 
there  was still a feeling th a t, whenever possible, every e ffo rt should be made to 
provide housing within the city.
When the above circum stances are combined with a political environm ent, within 
the council, which emphasised the benefits of municipalisation of social capital, 
it is hardly surprising th a t any residential land in the city  which could be built on, 
was alm ost immediately snapped up by the city  for local authority housing. This 
was regardless usually of any in terest which had been expressed in the site, by 
p rivate housebuilders (MacFayden 1980).
The council used this land to  satisfy the enormous need for housing in Glasgow 
and, a t the same tim e, avoided decanting a t least some of the city 's population. 
The corollary of this was th a t private housebuilders were denied the opportunity 
to  develop, what they then regarded as a ttrac tiv e  greenfield sites within the 
city . They therefore continued to  concentra te  their activ ities in o ther areas, 
outside of the city , and this was a pa tte rn  which events continued to  follow 
throughout the 1960's and early 1970's (Table 3.1).
Between 1961 and 1971 a further 607 ha. were added to  the contiguous built up 
area  of Glasgow, and on the 230 ha. added to  the city  itself, once again local 
authority  housing dominated. The rem ainder was almost exclusively used for 
private housebuilding; Bearsden, Milngavie and Bishopbriggs being the main 
areas of expansion.
The most notable fea tu re  of these la te r figures,however, is the way in which the 
to ta l acreage added to  the im m ediate suburbs is less than half of what was added 
in the  preceeding decade. This dram atic decline reflected  a growing shortage of 
building land, most noticeable in Glasgow, as pressures for expansion cam e up 
against the  restrictions imposed by the green belt.
This acted  as a check on the steady growth of the built-up area.
In those suburbs which had been the almost exclusive preserve of the  private 
builders the decline, though less severe, was equally dram atic and the trend 
continued through to  1976. (Table 3.1). The housebuilders operating in these 
areas were also, quite clearly, experiencing some difficulty in obtaining a supply 
of land sufficient to  m aintain their previous level of activ ity  in these contiguous 
suburbs. How then did they reac t to this new situation?
The maps in Fig 3.3 to  3.5 show th a t by the early 1970's the private builders had 
extended their in terest to  detached settlem ents in the landward areas of 
Glasgow's surrounding d istric ts. Table 3.2. shows the number of sites purchased 
in each of the 5 km. bands drawn around Glasgow, over the th ree  tim e periods 
shown on the maps.
NUMBER OF SITES
Band (Kms) 1959-63 1963-1961 1968-71
0-5 9 9 5
5-10 2k 22 9
10-15 37 21 17
15-20 11 20 26
20-25 10 22 8
25-30 k 12 20
Table 3.2.
It is clear th a t by 1972 the  main areas of activ ity  had
im m ediate edge of the city to  sites up to  30 kms away.
Between 1961 and 1976 these settlem ents, beyond the contiguous built up area, 
emerged as the dominant zone of growth in the Glasgow area. However, despite 
this change there  still rem ained the old distinction between areas characterised 
by private housebuilding and those dominated by public sector housebuilding.
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The New Towns accounted for most of the la tte r  but, in contrast, a number of 
small places, like W aterfoot in Eastwood D istrict, South Lenzie in Strathkelvin 
D istrict and Blanefield in the Strathblane area, all increased their population by 
more than 40 per cent in the la te  60's to  early 70's,almost wholly due to the work 
of private housebuilders. Similar developments took place in bigger settlem ents, 
such as Eaglesham in Eastwood D istrict and Kirkintilloch and Stepps in 
Strathkelvin; all of which increased their population by more than 20 per cent 
between 1967 and 1975. L ater additions to  these growth areas were, Torrance 
and Milton of Campsie in Strathkelvin D istrict, and on the south side of the city 
private housebuilding, previously concentrated  in the Giffnock/Newton Mearns 
area, now spilled over with more frequency than before into what is now Renfrew 
D istrict (Lea 1980). All of these developments reflected  the pressure on 
housebuilders, to  find new sources of land for private building.
A fea tu re  of all these developments, however, is the way in which they took 
place in areas long favoured by the housebuilders. The extension of their 
activ ities into the landward area of such d istricts was an almost natural 
progression; but this was not the only change. The builder’s sphere of in terest 
did expand to  include some parts of Dumbarton, Hamilton and Lanark D istricts; 
particulary those parts with good road and/or rail links to  allow for easy 
commuting, and where suitable land could be bought for housing.
In spite of this belated and relatively minor spread in the activ ities of private 
housebuilders, a momentum which had s ta rted  to  build up before even the Second 
World War,had culminated by 1976, in an alm ost to ta l split in the housing m arket 
of the Clydeside conurbation. This is clearly illustrated  by the housing tenure 
figures in Table 3.3.
CURRENT TENURE OP HOUSEHOLDS (<f>) 1979
District Owner Occupied Public Rented
Argyll and Bute 44.3 37*1
Dumbarton 39.4 54.3
Renfrew 31.6 63.8
Inverclyde 25.9 65.2
Clydebank 17.2 79.8
Bearsden 81.2 15.4
Glasgow 25.4 . 6 5.2
Strathkelvin 53.2 43.5
Eastwood 86*8 11.2
Cumbernauld 19.5 79.7
Monklands 15.0 83.6
Motherwell 14.0 83.7
Lanark 39.1 56.1
Hamilton 30.2 67.0
East Kilbride 24.7 74.3
Cunninghame 34.3 61.4
Kilmarnock 28.4 67.5
Kyle and Carrick 45.5 47.4
Cumnock 13*3 79.8
Strathclyde 30.5 53.3
Table 3*3 Source: S.
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The areas where private housebuilders had been active from an early date 
(Eastwood, Strathkelvin and Bearsden) show the highest figures for owner 
occupancy. The figures for these districts contrast vividly with these for areas 
in which no tradition of private housebuilding has existed - Motherwell, 
Monklands and Glasgow*. While even d istricts like Hamilton and Renfrew have 
figures for owner occupancy more than 50 per cent lower than Eastwood and 
Bearsden; despite having some past history of private housebuilding. The result 
of this has been a marked and growing social polarisation between some d istricts, 
including Glasgow, and suburban areas such as Eastwood and Strathkelvin where 
the vast m ajority of private investm ent in housing has taken place over the last 
40 years.
As Donnison and Soto (1980) point out, this is a process which creates gaps and 
discontinuities in the ladder of opportunity, the disjunctions in the m arket 
making it difficult to move from one rung onto the next. This implies th a t "it 
would help people if the rungs in the ladders of opportunity were set close to 
each other, economically, spatially and culturally. People move most easily to  a 
slightly more expensive house, close to  their previous home" (Donnison 1972). To 
achieve this the planner must a ttem p t to break the patte rn  of events described 
above, but history creates its own momentum and this creates problems when 
trying to  control and direct the actions of private housebuilders.
*The Glasgow figure for owner occupancy still includes some poor quality 
tenem ental property and therefore  under emphasises the paucity of private 
investm ent in new housebuilding.
It was the exclusion of private housebuilders from the city , and other industrial 
burghs (eg. Motherwell and Airdrie), from such an early date  and to  such a 
marked ex ten t, which established an almost self-fulfilling precedent. Once the 
housebuilders had turned their a tten tion  to  other areas then they soon developed 
a predilection for working there. Previous investm ent decisions, particularly  by 
some of the  builders who had operated in the area from an early date, were able 
to  generate  opportunities for la te r sim ilar decisions. In addition ,the builders 
were able to  establish a certain  understanding of what was required of them in 
these areas, and developed an expertise for dealing with the special problems 
found there . No such tradition  developed outside of these d istric ts and even 
when some of the  builders extended their activ ities in the 60's and early 70's, as 
was noted above, they did so mainly in settlem ents close to  where they already 
had some experience of housebuilding.
The result of this geographically concentrated activ ity  by private housebuilders 
was th a t certa in  areas were established in the custom ers' minds as being the  one 
in which to  buy and own a house. The builders had successfully created  a m arket 
for new housing in these areas and could make plans to  m eet th a t demand by 
putting further investm ents into the area.
The above factors have contributed to  the establishm ent of powerful vested 
in terests  in these areas and it would require, therefore , a g reat deal of e ffo rt if 
they were to  be overcome. Any land-use planning policies which sought to  turn 
round this well established process would have to  be well briefed in the 
d ifficulties likely to  be encountered.
Land-use planners would also have to be alive to  the danger of such long 
established trends in housebuilding being presented as the normal way of things; 
as opposed to  being the outcome of distinct historical circum stances. It is in the 
builders' in terests  to  ensure th a t the form er view prevails and th a t plans are
made which allow things to  continue as before. The planner must be prepared 
not only to  say th a t things can be d ifferent, but also explain why, and how he can 
make them  so.
We have now considered the kind of m arket forces which have built up in the 
G reater Glasgow area  and the way in which they might be used to  d ic ta te  future 
developments. In order to bring this p icture up-to-date, and before considering 
the residential land policies of the Strathclyde Structure Plan, a tten tion  must 
now be focussed on the agents working through these m arket forces - the 
housebuilders them selves.
In Britain the building industry is generally characterised  by a m ultiplicity of 
small firm s and a small number of large firm s (Bassett and Short 1980).
Of the estim ated 84,000 firms in operation in 1976 more than th ree-quarters of 
them employed few er than 8 workers (Cowley 1979). Although it is c lear th a t 
those small firms dom inate in numbers, firm s with over 1200 operatives 
accounted for 21.5 per cent of output in 1965 and 24 per cent in 1973 (Bassett 
and Short 1980). N evertheless,even the largest English housebuilder constructed 
only 10 per cent of the new houses sold in 1979 - 11,000 units. In Scotland during 
the 20 year period up till 1970 the  s tructu re  of the building industry was similar 
to  the overall British picture in some respects but vastly d ifferen t in others.
The industry showed, and still shows, the numerical domination of small firms 
which is a characteris tic  of the British scene: 60 per cent of builders in Scotland 
have few er than 8 employees, and nearly a third of contractors' operatives work 
in firms employing under 35 people (National Economic Development Office
1976). At the top end of the scale, however, things were somewhat d ifferent 
from the British pattern .
Over 1967 and 1968, for example, a  single housebuilder built alm ost 25 per cent 
of the en tire  output of private houses in Scotland, and together with nine other 
large firms was responsible for more than 65 per cent of the to ta l Scottish output 
(Sidwell 1970). When these nationally aggregated s ta tistics  are further broken 
down the degree of com petition is reduced even more, and many of the Scottish 
builders had near monopolies in their own area  of activ ity .
For example, one builder (John Lawrence) between 1959 and 1972 bought over 40 
per cent of all the private housing land purchased in one county (Dunbarton); and 
two builders, Varney and Wimpey (the only non-Scottish firm operating on any 
scale in West C entral Scotland during this period) bought over 35 per cent of all 
the private housing land in Lanark county between the same dates; and in the 
county of Renfrew two builders, (Lawrence and McTaggart Mickel) bought 35 per 
cent of the housing land which was for sale over th a t period (Figures taken from 
S.D.D. (1974)). Thus,as Niven (1979) points out, a substantial acreage of the 
prim e building land around Glasgow was, by the early 1970's owned by a small 
number of housebuilders. F u rtherm ore , as Table 3.3 shows, a significant 
proportion of this would appear to  have been land which was being banked for 
la te r use.
A c re  ELffp
Actual of land purchased in C entral Scotland compared with theoretical
land requirem ents for the private housebuilding m arket ^
Actual
Theoretical
1964 1965 1964 1967 1968 1967 1970 1971 1972
890 853 1068 1559 627 797 743 943 1292
455 433 451 429 516 527 473 774 749
Table 3.4 Source: From S.D.D. (1975)
It is im portant in this respect to  note th a t the  kind of housebuilders who were 
involved in these transactions were, by and large, the type of firm described in 
chapter two as being non-growth oriented. This m eant th a t while they had 
purchased considerable quantities of land they did not feel the need to  make full 
or im m ediate use of this resource.
The number of houses which they built w ere,therefore,o ften  well below what the 
m arket might have been able to  sustain, and profitability  was a more im portant 
motive than growth. These Scottish based builders were, and still are, the firms 
which have shown the g rea test propensity to  purchase, outright, long term  
speculative land. This tendency to  tie  up resources in the com paratively long 
term  purchase of land reflec ts  a company policy, or ’e th ic1, which places a low 
priority on the rapid turnover of capital. It is, as we shall see la te r, a method of 
operations which contrasts sharply with th a t employed by the recently  arrived 
firm s now working in the area.
These 'local1 building firms were also the companies who had been operating in 
the area  from a very early date and, alm ost single-handedly, had built the early 
suburban esta tes  around the city . Most of the land which they purchased was, 
th e re fo re , in areas adjacent to , or obvious extensions of, those initial 
investm ents. They had, in th a t case ,a  vested in terest in the continued growth of 
private housing in these traditional areas.
These were all factors which would require consideration should any a ttem p t be 
made to  employ land-use planning as the means to  red irect the activ ities of these 
firm s. This situation, however, was to  be even further com plicated from the  la te  
1960's and early  1970's onwards by the incursion into the local housebuilding 
scene of a number of English based volume builders.
There would appear to  be two main reasons for this new developm ent.
F irst, as suggested earlier, the level of activ ity  which characterised the Scottish 
based builders was not high enough to  satisfy the potential demand for new 
private housing in the area. A gap had been le ft open in the m arket into which 
o ther builders could fit their operations. Second, some builders were beginning 
to  run out of m arkets in England and were looking around for opportunities for 
growth elsewhere. As one planner in his evidence to  the House of Commons 
Expenditure C om m ittee pointed out, the builders "having had tw enty or more 
years of easy pickings in England had developed all the easy sites" (H.M.S.O.
1977); they were now looking for new areas where they could continue to  expand 
their activ ities. Several firm s saw the, as yet untapped, opportunities which 
existed in West C entral Scotland as representing the ideal opportunity for further 
growth. A number of the most im portant of those builders are listed below along 
with the date on which they commenced activ ities in Scotland.
The distinguishing characteristic  of all these firms is the way in which they 
d iffer from the traditional Scottish builders in their mode of operation. For 
these firms the ir main concern is for growth i.e. increased turnover and 
maximum cash flow. To do th a t they must build a relatively high minimum 
number of houses each year in order to  both satisfy the shareholders and stock 
m arket, and m eet the high fixed costs which are associated with a larger firm.
Bellway Ltd 
Leech Homes Ltd 
Salvensen Homes Ltd 
Bovis Homes Ltd 
B arratts (Falkirk) Ltd 
Broseley E states Ltd 
Tarm ac (McLeans Homes) 
B arratts (Glasgow) Ltd
1967
1968
1969 
1973*
1976
1977 
19 77 
1979
*Bovis had operated in Scotland prior to  1973 but only on a very lim ited scale 
building luxury homes.
B arratts (Glasgow) Ltd, who operate  in the im m ediate Clydeside area, must, for 
example build and sell a minimum of 350 houses every year in order to  m eet 
operating costs alone; and aim for over 450 to  achieve the kind of growth th a t 
their investors want to  see.
This implies th a t for these firms the number one priority is to  obtain land on 
which they can s ta r t building and selling houses, and the pressure on them to  do 
so is intense. But as we have seen above much of the best building land was 
already in the hands of Scottish based builders. This le ft the incoming firms with 
only two courses of action open to  them .
F irst, they could take over one of the Scottish based firms and so acquire a ready 
made supply of land. Bovis, who had operated for some years in Scotland but on 
a very lim ited scale, when they decided to  expand their operations,did so by 
buying out Varney Homes in 1973; thereby acquiring a large, ready-to-use land 
bank. This allowed Bovis to  extend their activ ities into the lower and middle 
ranges of house construction and enormously increase their ra te  of building from 
a few dozen to  over 300. A number of o ther firms used the same approach; 
Leech, Bellway, B arratts  (Falkirk) and Tarmac all acquired land banks by taking 
over Scottish based firms.
This method could not, of course, be used on every occasion and in some cases 
the land thus acquired was not sufficient to  m eet the new owners requirem ents. 
In order to  deal with this problem a number of the new firms resorted to  buying 
land from other builders.
This was a p ractise which grew in im portance throughout C entral Scotland during 
the 1970's. Initially it s ta rted  out as only isolated cases but the proportion of 
land purchased in this way had increased to  over 20 per cent by the mid 1970's
and in 1978/79 the figure was up to  36 per cent; one builder in particular, 
B arratts, appeared to favour this method of acquiring land and in 1978/79 it was 
responsible for 27 per cent of the 36 per cent purchased in this way (S.D.D.
1980). The reason for B arratts  using this method is th a t land purchased from 
another builder often had planning permission; it is therefore  a quick method of 
acquiring imm ediately useable land albeit a t an inflated price.
In spite of all these efforts,how ever, there  was almost no way in which the new 
firms could break into the lucrative markets established in the best parts of 
Eastwood, Bearsden and Strathkelvin. This was because, as indicated earlier, 
much of what was the best building land in these d istric ts was already in the 
hands of a few builders ,well before the incoming firm s set up operations in 
Scotland. Of the builders who owned most of this land only Varney was taken 
over by an English based company and the other Scottish builders, as one would 
expect, showed no enthusiasm for selling this land direct to  other firm s. These 
constraints forced the English based firm s to turn  their a tten tion  towards what 
were previously quite unfashionable areas for private housebuilding.
Private House Completions in Motherwell and Monkland D istricts 1973-79
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Motherwell: 140 109 134 197 580
Monklands: 10 23 161 293 176
Table 3.5
There have been a number of major developments by incoming builders in areas 
such as Motherwell and Monklands D istrict which, until com paratively recently,
had alm ost no tradition  of private housebuilding (the very low owner-occupancy 
ra tes for these d istricts in Table 3.3. bears testam en t to  this): And a t the same 
tim e a number of the less popular areas in D istricts such as Hamilton and Lanark, 
for example Larkhall and Blackwood respectively, were used as sites for very 
large private housing esta tes.
For the  English based firm s the one advantage which all these areas possessed 
was an absence of extensive land banks owned by their Scottish com petitors. The 
new firm s consequently could find room for manoeuvre and expansion in these 
areas.
From the  above it  is c lear th a t the housebuilding industry in Central Scotland has 
experienced some major changes in recen t years. But what implications does the 
resulting s tructu re  have for a ttem pts to control and red irect its activ ities?
In the firs t place it is quite clear th a t the kind of housebuilder now operating in 
the Glasgow area is quite d ifferent from what was the norm only 10-15 years 
ago. Many of the firms are now large national, if not international, firms and in 
their methods of operation they d iffer quite substantially from the regionally 
based, trad itional Scottish builder.
The la tte r  group of firm s had, from an early date, established themselves in a 
particu lar area. They had built up both the expertise and the resources to  sustain 
a level of work which was fe lt to  be satisfactory  and, a t the same tim e, placed 
them  under no g reat strain . In particu lar they had already bought quite 
substantial amounts of land (held both with and without planning permission*) in 
areas w h e r e  t h e y  knew  t h e y  c o u l d  s e l l  h o u s e s .
* Although detailed planning permission on a site  lapses a fte r 3 years, unless work 
has been sta rted , the definition of s ta rted  has been so broadly in terpreted tha t 
the digging of a single trench for foundations will preserve the permission.
These features all imply th a t such firm s did not feel the need to  exert any great 
pressure on the planners for the release of land. The security of their business 
did not depend on an ever increasing number of house sales, and the land which 
they had already bought was in good locations and would sustain their preferred  
level of activ ity  for some years.
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The corollary of this, however, is th a t the planning system finds itse lf in a 
situation where it can do little  or nothing to  influence the activ ities of these 
housebuilders. This is because there  are  very few ways in which the planner can 
apply either effective  sanctions or pressure to these firm s. The builders already 
had land, it was all they needed, and in many cases it was in areas where, on 
physical planning grounds alone, it was difficult to refuse permission for 
developm ent; the site  often being a natural progression from a previous 
development.
All these factors probably contributed to  the tranquil relationship between 
planners and housebuilders which was noted by Gaskin (1977). He considered 
th a t the provision of housing land was not a problem which was particularly  
prevalent in Scotland. At the tim e he was writing, however, th a t phase in the 
Scottish housebuilding industry had recently  come to an end; the  new 
housebuilding firms moving into the area fundamentally changed the milieu 
within which the planning system had to  operate.
These new firms were com m itted to  growth and expansion and as a d irect result, 
were desperate for housing land. U nfortunately for these firms, this intensive 
search for land cam e up against the obstacle th a t most of the best sites were 
already in the hands of other builders. Where this difficulty could not be 
overcome, by either buying land from o ther companies or, taking over a local 
firm to obtain their land back, it was inevitable th a t pressure would be applied to  
the planners for the release of more land. Furtherm ore because of the way in 
which these firm s operated, and the alm ost compelling need for land this 
generated, it was a demand which they would be unlikely to  withdraw unless they 
had achieved their objectives.
Yet, to  the planner, the situation appeared to  be one in which there  was already 
an adequate supply of land, often in fa c t already owned by building firms. For 
the newly established companies the problem was th a t they, in fac t, did not own 
the land, their Scottish based com petitors did. A position had been established 
then, where conflict between the planners and the builders was alm ost 
unavoidable.
It is im portant to rem em ber in this respect th a t/ when the inevitable 
confrontation between the two sides took place 9 these firms, during any 
negotiations, could make use of some adro it bargaining skills. They were mostly 
large firms, part of even larger holding companies, and had learned a g reat deal 
from their operations in other parts  of the  country. This m eant there was 
expertise, if not im m ediately available then on tap  from elsewhere, which could 
be used to  ensure th a t, as far as possible decisions went their way. Should the 
planner want to  control the activ ities of these companies then his argum ents, his 
bargaining skills and his com m itm ent would have to  m atch those of his 
’adversary'.
This was particularly im portant now, because the arrival of these builders 
offered an opportunity to  d irect private investm ent in housebuilding which had 
not existed before. The die had not yet been cast which would d ic ta te  the areas 
in which these housebuilders would operate and, as we have seen, many of the 
firms did in fac t choose to  build in some of the previously neglected areas. 
Clearly then an instrum ent was now to  hand which could be used to  achieve some 
of the planners objectives for new housebuilding, but could it be wielded with any 
dexterity?
To answer th a t question we must look a t how the  private builders and and local 
authorities reacted  to  the residential land policies contained in the Strathclyde 
Structure Plan. As a precurser to  th a t investigation the background to, and the 
eventual fa te  of,these policies is briefly sketched.
SECTION TWO
It was the West Central Scotland Plan which first emphasised the need to 
improve the urban environment of Clydeside, and as part of tha t strategy  
advocated the need to  improve the opportunities for owner-occupation in the 
city:
"One aspect of private housebuilding where we believe there  is a special 
need for support from local authorities is the encouragem ent of schemes 
for owner-occupation within the inner areas of Glasgow and possibly other 
urban centres in the region"
(West C entral Scotland Plan 197*0
It is also of in terest to  note th a t the  plan calculated there  would be an average of 
4000-6000 private house completions, per annum, over the period 1971-1981.
When Strathclyde Region was set up in 1975 it choose to  follow and develop the 
tenor established by the West Central Scotland Plan. While Boyle (1980) 
considers this is because "only a very brave or very foolish council" could have 
discounted the s tatem ents contained in the West C entral Scotland Plan, it is 
probably just as true  to  say th a t these policies reflected  the  im m ediate 
predilections of the council anyway.
The Regional Report, subm itted in 1976, was the first major stra teg ic  document
produced by the council and to  a large ex ten t it "fashioned the direction and
scope of fu ture land based policies" for the area  (Boyle 1980). It did in fac t carry
forward many of the ideas contained in the West C entral Scotland Plan and this
was particularly true  in the field of housing. With the selective outflow of
population from the city very much in mind, the Regional Report stated :
"There is an urgent need to  encourage private housing by making land
available and by other means, particulary in the inner conurbation
where there  is a declining choice of kinds of housing"
(Strathclyde Regional Council 1976a)
The close parallel to  the sentim ents of the West C entral Scotland Plan is 
transparently  clear.
The D raft S tructure Plan carried forward and developed these ideas, seeing as
one of the main s tra teg ic  issues.
"The extent to  which the a ttractiveness of the conurbation can be
improved and the continuing decentralisation of population and decline
of population curtailed"
(Strathclyde Regional Council 1977)
This was a stra tegy  which they fe lt was jeopardized by the existence of a
substantial land bank for private housing, in some of the suburban d istric ts
around the edge of the city . To control this the Region initially proposed to
rezone large parts of the land bank and
"considered th a t any applications for residential developm ent in these
areas - (which the region wished to see rezoned)-should be refused" 
(Strathclyde Regional Council 1977)
The next stage, a f te r  consultations on the  D raft Plan had taken place, was the
publication, in 1979, of the S tructure Plan W ritten S tatem ent. This document
continued in a sim ilar vein and recognising the uneven distribution of owner-
occupied housing within the region, proposed in policy RES 1 tha t:
"Residential developm ent on infill or redevelopm ent sites within urban
areas excluding open space, in preference to  peripheral 'Greenfield'
sites shall accord with the Regional development strategy"
(Strathclyde Regional Council 1979)
A policy which as Coon (1979) notes, expressed the essence of the S tructure Plan 
philosophy as it had developed from the West C entral Scotland Plan,through the 
Regional Report and D raft Plan.
There are, however, two points worth noting about the housing land policies 
contained in the S tructure Plan. F irst, the plan contained what appeared to  be. 
am biguities in its approach. While, as policy RES 1 indicates,private residential 
development was to  concentrate  on the urban renewal of inner areas,elsew here 
the plan advocated the building of private houses on
"selected greenfield sites on the edge of established urban areas 
bordering on housing areas experiencing considerable population loss"
(Strathclyde Regional Council 1979)
This is a 'compromise', or qualification, which had not appeared in previous 
documents pertaining to  the S tructure Plan.
The second point to note is th a t the council was forced to  withdraw its earlier 
proposal, contained in the 1976 Survey R eport, th a t the large peripheral land 
bank be controlled by the revocation of planning permission. The enormous 
compensation costs which would have been involved made it impossible for the 
region to  pursue this policy.
The S tructure Plan itself has now been amended by the modifications required by 
the Secretary of S ta te  a fte r the Examination in Public (E.I.P.). The policies 
concerned with private housing have been approved, with qualifications, only as 
far as 1st June 1982,and the Secretary of S tate  has concluded th a t "the potential 
of infill and redevelopm ent sites (for private housing) in urban areas has been 
over estim ated" (S.D.D. 1981). The Regional Council has therefore  been 
instructed , in e ffec t, to  rethink its housing policies by undertaking a re ­
assessm ent of housing-land supply,and dem and,bearing in mind th a t "the release 
of fu rther greenfield sites may be necessary" (S.D.D. 1981). The result has been 
th a t a philosophy pursued since 1974 of redirecting private investm ent in 
housebuilding away from greenfield sites, in suburban areas, has experienced its 
first major set-back a t what might have been considered the last hurdle. What 
are  the factors which contributed to  this frustration  of earlier established 
policy?
Some of the elem ents which might have contributed to this situation have been 
broadly indicated in this, and previous chapters but now require to  be explored in 
more detail with reference to  this particu lar case.
It is c lear th a t the housebuilders them selves played an im portant part in 
influencing the Secretary of S tate 's response to  the S tructure Plan's housing 
policies. It has already been shown th a t many of the firms now involved in 
private housebuilding in the area, were those for whom an adequate supply of
housing land was of param ount im portance. These same firms were being 
squeezed out of the best areas for private housebuilding by the remaining 
Scottish builders who owned a number of quality sites in these d istric ts. The 
incoming firms were therefore  com m itted to  ensuring their in terests were not 
further prejudiced by the policies contained in the Structure Plan. As a result* 
when it cam e to  preparing their contribution towards the Plan's Examination in 
Public, a g reat deal of e ffo rt and expertise was applied to  the operation. It is 
interesting to  note a t this juncture th a t, although the housebuilders choose to  
make a joint submission to  the E.I.P., John Lawrence (an im portant Scottish 
based builder) e lected  not to  be part of this co-operative e ffo rt. They fe lt tha t 
their d ifferent in terests would be b e tte r pursued by an individual submission and 
separate  representation. In fac t a t the  E.I.P. one of the demands which the 
incoming firm s made was th a t sufficient land be released to  allow them to  build 
up to  a 3 year land bank. John Lawrence, in con trast, adm itted  to  having, a 6 
year land bank with planning permission,and additional land awaiting permission 
(Planning Exchange 1979). This cogently illustrates the d ifferent circum stances 
of the two types of firm.
At the E.I.P. the joint submission put forward by the 'Strathclyde Region 
Housebuilders com m ittee ' (an ad-hoc group which relied very heavily on the work 
done by the English based volume builders), was a comprehensive and detailed, 16 
page document. It concluded th a t the housebuilders would "not accep t a series of 
policy statem ents and proposals (as contained in the Structure Plan) which could 
so radically a ffec t the future of private housebuilding" (S.R.H.C. 1979). This 
document contained a detailed s ta tis tica l exam ination of how the  housebuilders' 
anticipated  demand for private housing could not be m et unless more land for 
housebuilding was identified in the S tructure Plan; particularly  greenfield sites. 
Based on a projected demand exceeding 6,000 p.a. and rising to  over 7,000 p.a. in 
the years 1980-1983 the builders calculated th a t sites for a further 10,000
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additioral houses (approximately 400 ha) would have to  be identified in the plan. 
These f gures were strikingly illustrated in an accompanying graph (fig 3.6) which 
illustraied the growing gap between what the builders said was needed in the 
way of housing land and what the Structure Plan was making available.
At the E.I.P. the  housebuilders vigorously pursued their case throughout the 
discussbn on the residential land policies. They expressed the view th a t the 
figure for annual house completions which should be used to calculate fu ture land 
needs vas 7,000, and th a t anything below 6,000 was unrealistic: They quoted
figures to  show how the  price of land had increased from £10,000 per acre in 
1976 to  £30,000 per acre  in 1979, because of land shortages; and they added th a t 
as a result land now represented some 15-20 per cent of the to ta l house price; 
which in turn m eant the builders were forced to  construct smaller houses of 
poorer cuality (Planning Exchange 1979).
The weight and authority  of all these argum ents clearly made an im pact on the 
reporter, and subsequently the Secretary of S tate . In fac t the housebuilders 
conclusion - th a t sites for as many as 10,000 additional houses would be required, 
was both quoted by the reporter and, used by the Secretary of S tate  when 
explaining why he considered the release of further green field sites might be 
necessary. But why should the argum ents of the housebuilders have so 
convincingly carried the day?
3.10 P art of the answer lies in the ease with which the housebuilders could discredit 
certain  elem ents of the Strathclyde case. This was most obvious in the figures 
for annual private house completions which the Region used in its preparation of 
the Structure Plan.
In a paper published in 1978 "to provide a basis for information and analysis" of 
the Regions planning stra tegy , the planners calculated a "demand for around 
3,400 new owner-occupied houses on average for each year in the period to  1983"
OWNER-OCCUPIED 
HOUSE 
COMPLETIONS 
in 
STRATHCLYDE
(S tathclyde Regional Council 1978). In the S tructure Plan itself a figure of 
3,030 dwellings per annum is put forward as the minimum average ra te  of private 
housebuilding during the plan period. The figure used as a basis for planning land 
supply was slightly higher than this a t 3,500, but a t the E.I.P. itself the planners 
stated th a t their calculations now led them to believe 3,200 was a more likely 
figure (Planning Exchange 1979).
In lefuting these estim ates, the builders were able to  point out th a t only once in 
the past nine years had the figure for annual house completions fallen to 
anywhere near th a t figure (3,500 in 1974) and th a t only tw ice in the same period 
had it been below 4,000 (Fig 3.7). At the same tim e in the year imm ediately 
p reced in g  the E.I.P. over 5,000 houses had been built; and for 1979 the builders 
estim ated, a t the tim e of the E.I.P., a com pletions figure of 6,000 (in fac t it 
turned out to be just over 5,000). The figures used by the Region to  justify their 
policies appeared in the circum stances to  be alm ost ridiculous, and with hindsight 
the planners have adm itted th a t it was impossible to  defend their figures against 
this kind of evidence. The estim ates put forward by the housebuilders would 
appear, th e re fo re , to have been accepted, alm ost by default, as being more 
representative of the prevailing situation; however inflated they might have 
been. In fac t the 6,000-7,000 p.a. com pletion figure suggested by the builders 
would appear now, to  have been somewhat over optim istic.
This was not, however, the only area  in which the planners seem to  have been a t 
a disadvantage vis-a-vis the builders. Many of the figures which the 
housebuilders put forward a t the E.I.P. w ere misleading, if not incorrect, yet 
went unchallenged by the planners. The builders, for example,quoted a figure of 
£30,000 per acre as the current price for building land. In fac t the median price 
per acre of building land in the C entral Belt of Scotland over the period 
October 1978-June 1979 was £7,168. It was only in the cen tre  of Glasgow and
Edinburgh tha t a very small number of sites were sold for about £30,000 per acre. 
(S.D.D. 1980).
The builders also s ta ted  th a t 15-20 p*r cent of a house price was taken up by land 
costs: ]n 1975, 1976 and 1977 the plot price as a percentage of house price in 
C entral Scotland was actually 3.3, 3.1 and 3.6 per cent respectively. As before,it 
was only in a few city  cen tre  developments th a t the figures approached those 
given by the housebuilders (S.D.D. 1980). The inability of the planners to 
question or challenge these statem ents from the housebuilders, illustrates how ill 
prepared and poorly briefed the public officials were compared to  their private 
counterparts.
How much im portance one should a ttach  to  the above events is difficult to 
assess, but it is clear from the Secretary of S tate 's reply to the Structure Plan 
th a t the view which prevailed was th a t of the  housebuilders. In view of the 
weak, unrealistic and apparently poorly prepared counter argum ents put up by 
the Region this, with hindsight, would appear to  have been inevitable.
3-11 A further weakness in Strathclyde's case was the am bivalent if not indifferent 
a ttitu d e  adopted a t the E.I.P. by both senior officials and members of the 
Regional Council.
The Regional R eport,as  Pritchard (1978) points ou t,had  "incorporated a high 
degree of member involvement", and this involvement also implied a significant 
degree of political com m itm ent to  the policies which it contained (Young 1980). 
The Draft Plan followed the Report and Pritchard (1978) similarly identifies a 
strong political input, by the councillors, to  th a t document. The Structure Plan 
w ritten  sta tem en t would appear, however, to  have a ttra c ted  somewhat less 
political support.
Many of the  councillors found it difficult to  involve them selves, once again, in
what was becoming a more and more technical document a t each successive 
stage in the process. The plan, therefore, did not have the same political weight 
behind it th a t previous documents had exhibited (Young 1980). The result was 
fia t a number of the senior planning officials and councillors of the Region 
rarely attended the Examination in Public which followed the publication of the 
plan (Cameron 1980). This lack of visible and active support from the upper 
ranks of the council de tracted  from the plan's au th o rity , and thus gave the 
housebuilders the opportunity to  stam p their influence on events.
Of perhaps even g rea ter im portance in this respect was the almost to ta l apathy 
displayed towards the policies in the S tructure Plan by councillors and senior 
members of Glasgow D istrict Council. At the E.I.P. none of the D istrict's senior 
officials, or members, were present to  lend support and authority to  the 
Structure Plan proposals. While even in their w ritten  submission on the housing 
aspects of the plan, the strongest words of support expressed only "general 
agreement" with the Regional Councils s tra tegy  (Glasgow D istrict Council 1979). 
As this was the area towards which it was hoped to  divert private investm ent in 
housebuilding, the  lukewarm reception accorded to  the plan did nothing to  bolster 
its credibility or prestige. One senior member of Strathclyde Region, Charles 
Gray, described Glasgow's disappointing response to  the S tructure Plan as being 
the major fac to r which contributed to  the Secretary of State 's very qualified 
acceptance of the  housing policies (Gray 1981).
Why Glasgow should have chosen to  adopt this course of action with the 
Structure Plan is not altogether clear; particularly  in view of the effo rts which 
the D istrict Council were already making to  encourage private housebuilding in 
the city . One D istrict Councillor, Jean Me Fadden, suggested th a t the city's 
hesitant support reflected  their reluctance to  antagonize the other 'less favoured'
distric ts in the region. In other words th a t it was an exercise in diplomacy 
(McFadden 1981). The officials a t S trathclyde Region were more inclined to  put 
it down to pique on the part of the D istrict. The city , as it made plain to  the 
Stodart C om m ittee, s till hankered a fte r its lost, all-purpose sta tus (H.M.S.O.
1981). It choose,therefore,to  accord the minimum of recognition to  the authority 
which had denied them  of some of their powers - S trathclyde. This created  an 
uncertain and ambiguous atm osphere betw een the two authorities.
All this u ltim ately m eant, th a t Glasgow D istrict and Strathclyde Region could 
not represent them selves as a cohesive and determ ined partnership prepared to 
resist the pressures applied by an alm ost wholly united housebuilding industry. A 
weakness which the builders could exploit by playing one side's views off the 
o ther, to reveal inconsistencies in their argum ents. They used this ta c tic , with 
particularly  telling e ffec t, to  reveal the Region's inadequate comprehension of 
housing land in the city  (Planning Exchange 1979); and when this was combined 
with the Region's own apparent uncertainty about where the housebuilders should 
be encouraged to work - inner city sites or the peripheral e sta tes  (3.8) - then the 
plans very credibility in this area was clearly  under suspicion.
3.12 A fac to r which played a less im portant role in this conflict than one might have 
expected was the response from the remaining D istrict Councils. While it might 
have been fo recast th a t the housebuilders would have been found "allied with the 
dynamic of the d is tric t authority  against the prevarication of the county 
(regional) authority" (Gransby 1975), this was not always the case.
Bearrsden and Milngavie (1979) "accepted th a t the S tructure Plan policy of inner 
city regeneration —  would involve the promotion of private sector housebuilding 
in th e  inner city" — and — "accepted as a corollary th a t there  must be 
restric tions on private housebuilding in the traditional areas". In similar spirit
Strathkelvin D istrict Council had already, in its Housing Plan, opposed the 
development of large areas of land currently  zoned for private housing; and 
Eastwood D istrict Council, although expressing some disquiet over the projected 
house completion figures for their area, "raised no objections" to  the residential 
policies in the plan (Strathkelvin D istrict Council 1979, Eastwood D istrict 
Council 1979).
The main reason for this somewhat muted reaction, however, was th a t the 
Region had already been forced to  back down on an earlier proposal to  control 
the land banks, held in these d istric ts, by the revocation of planning consents 
(Strathclyde Regional Council 1976). It meant th a t the Region had no alternative  
but to  accept the  developm ent of most sites currently allocated for private 
housing in these d istric ts.
This land then had to  be included in the  overall to ta l considered to  be available 
for housing within the Region. It was land, however, which was usually held by 
Scottish based builders, and the  ra te  a t which it was developed was much slower 
than demand fac to rs would normally have d icta ted  (Eastwood D istrict Council 
1979). Y et, with the demise of the Community Land Act, there  was no way in 
which the d istric t, or regional authority , could effectively  intervene in the land 
m arket to  allow this land to  be released to  o ther builders; so easing the supply 
problems experienced elsewhere.
The subdued response from these d istric ts , with regard to  the S tructure Plan, was 
in fac t a  reflection of both the Region's, and the D istricts inability to  control the 
land banks which 20 years of m arket forces had built up in these areas. The 
available means of control w ere clearly not up to  the n eeds which were d icta ted  
by the plan's objectives.
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The D istricts which in fac t raised the strongest objections were those into which 
the housebuilders had just recently  extended their activ ities - Hamilton, 
Renfrew, Lanark e tc . It was also in these areas th a t the incoming firm s wanted 
the Structure Plan to  show more flexibility and allow for the release of more 
greenfield sites. In these areas the new firm s could a t least expect to  have an 
opportunity to both aquire and use any land which might be released.
It is c lear from the above th a t the reception given to  the S tructure Plan’s 
residential land policies ; varied amongst the D istrict Councils, from opposition, 
through indifference, to  qualified support: A p a tte rn  which might have been
expected in a region which contains 19 low er-tier authorities. In the 
circum stances, it is difficult to see how the view proffered by any one d istric t 
might have had more influence than any of the others. If the Region had been 
able to  find a policy, around which it could have rallied support of all its 
d istric ts, then the weight of opinion which it represented would have been 
impossible to ignore. But, as it was, the conflicting views and aims of the 
d istric ts simply cancelled each other out, leaving only the Region to  champion, 
as best it could, the S tructure Plan policies. And, in any event, it would be 
alm ost impossible to find any positive policy which failed to  antagonise a t least 
one of the Regions 19 low er-tier au thorities.
3.13 A further factor which must have contributed to  the housebuilders relative 
success a t the E.I.P., though to  what ex ten t is uncertain, was the sym pathetic 
reception being given, throughout the country, to  any argum ents put forward by 
the housebuilders.
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This reflected  the influence of a Conservative, free-m arket orien tated , cen tral 
government which had accepted (thanks largely to  the work of Tom Baron a t the 
D.O.E.) th a t to  sustain the required level of private housebuilding there  was "no 
a lternative  but to  considerably increase the supply of greenfield sites" (Baron 
1980a).
The e ffects  of this have been particularly obvious in England w here,as Elson 
(1981) points o u t ,the demands of the housebuilders have prevailed on almost 
every occasion where there  has been a dispute over housing land. In Scotland 
th e re  is less opportunity to  observe any such trend developing, but it is clear th a t 
the Secretary  of S ta te  here,m ust, as fa r as is possible, follow the views of his 
collegues in England. It i s , therefore , perhaps hardly surprising th a t the 
housebuilders viewpoint should have received such a sym pathetic hearing in the 
S trathclyde case.
3.14 The above description of the private housing m arket, and the way in which it 
impinges upon the housing policies set out in Strathclyde's S tructure Plan, 
provides a basis from which to  draw some initial conclusions on the relationship 
betw een land-use planning and the m arket.
It is clear^ perhaps above all else, th a t when any a ttem p t is made to  influence the 
m arket forces which operate in this arena ,then the mechanisms which influence 
events must be analysed in detail. Without an understanding of the way in which 
the m arket actually operates, the conclusions arrived a t, the goals set, and the 
policies adopted,all exist in a vacuum and are unrelated to  the real world.
This implies th a t there  must be something more than just a survey and analysis 
s tage  prior to tha t of plan-making; th e re  has to  be an a ttem p t to  uncover the 
micro-econom ic linkages which are operating in the area, and the sector, which 
is under investigation.
It is these linkages which d ic ta te  the behaviour of decision agents, such as 
housebuilders, operating in the m arket. If the planner intends to  control and 
d irect the actions of housebuilders he must understand and appreciate  the 
contraints and pressures under which they are operating.
This analysis must also include a historical perspective of events. As Donnison 
(1972) points out, we do not live in "instant c ities without a history"; in order 
therefore to  change the present, and future, direction of m arket fo rc e s ,th e  
planner must be aw are of the momentum with which history has endowed them ; 
w ithout this knowledge he may find himself being swept along by an apparently 
irreversible flow of events.
There should also be an a ttem p t to  forge a strong and determ ined partnership 
between the relevant planning authorities in order to  counterbalance the 
com m itted and united opposition of the housebuilders. The tw o-tier planning 
system clearly makes this a d ifficult objective to  achieve. It would be naive to 
assume th a t any allocative policy could be to the d irect benefit of all parties and 
therefore  be unanimously supported. N evertheless, once priorities have been 
established, those who are to 'gain' should ensure, between them , th a t they are 
agreed on the objectives which are to  be pursued. The failure of Strathclyde 
Region and Glasgow D istrict was a neglect to  devise a common set of policy 
objectives and an agreed means of implementing those policies. This only served 
to  weaken the credibility of the S tructure  Plan and its related  policies.
This chapter has shown, by its exam ination of a particu lar case, just how 
in trica te  and involved the problems can become when planning a ttem pts to 
control m arket forces. Any error or weakness in the planners1 case will be 
im m ediately exploited by other groups, for their own benefit. While if the 
planner should incorrectly in te rp re t the prevailing m arket situation then the
wrong areas for intervention will be identified and the cru cial 'principia media1 
for effec tive  action will be missed.
The investigation so far has mainly concentrated on those aspects of the 
housebuilding m arket in West C entral Scotland which have frustrated  a ttem pts to  
control the ac tiv ities of the building firms. The following chapter goes on from 
there  to  consider how certa in  factors operating on the D istrict scale, in Glasgow, 
have influenced the relationship which exists there , between planners and 
housebuilders.
CHAPTER FOUR
PLANNING FOR PRIVATE SECTOR HOUSEBUILDING IN GLASGOW
.1 The preceeding chapter has shown how most of the land which becam e available 
for housebuilding in Glasgow was used by the city to  construct local authority 
houses. The enormous redevelopment programme which was being undertaken by 
the city implied an equally large need for new homes to  accom odate the 
displaced population. As Gracey (1973) has pointed out, in cities throughout 
Britain, the very g reat need for housing land which this generated, le ft a feeling 
in some quarters th a t it would be "almost crim inal to  suggest some of this land 
be put aside for private developers and middle-class esta tes". This was a view 
which a ttra c ted  particulary strong support in Glasgow City Chambers, where the 
councillors also adhered to  the notion tha t "publicly owned housing was one of 
the most powerful tools for the redistribution of incomes towards the poorer end 
of the scale" (Checkland 1976).
The result was th a t by the mid 1970's of over 300,000 houses in Glasgow D istrict 
more than 180,000 or 60 per cent were council owned; while a t least half of the 
120,000 houses a ttribu ted  to the owner-occupied sector were old tenem ent flats 
e ither privately owned^or privately rented by landlords. As Table 4.1. shows, the 
level of private house completions in the city throughout the 1960's (and before
Private House Completions in Glasgow
Year 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Total 197 164 57 93 77 203 182 57
Year 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Total 291 91 119 107 426 530 347 817
Table 4.1 Source: S.D.D. (1972-80)
that), up to  the  early 1970's was very low. The tab le  goes on, however, to  show 
tha t since the mid 1970's there  has been an almost dram atic  increase in the number 
of private houses built in Glasgow. In view of what has been said above this must 
have involved a change in the relationship between the council, both a t officer and 
member level, and the private housebuilder. How did this change come about?
4.2 One of the most im portant adjustm ents which had to  be made, before the private 
housebuilders could increase their scale of operation in the city , was in the a ttitude  
of the councillors them selves. Prior to  the mid 1970's the ideology of the 
councillors reflected  an 'old-fashioned', alm ost paternalistic  socialism. The city's 
housing problem was therefore  perceived as one to  be tackled directly by the 
council; and the only way to  plan for, and adm inister to , this need was to  own a 
high proportion of the city's social capital - its houses. But with the election of the 
new Glasgow D istrict Council, a f te r  local government re-organisation in 1975, a 
train  of events was first set in motion which would eventually see the councillor's' 
a ttitu d e  to  private builders fundam entally transform ed.
One of the first problems which the newly elected council identified was the ever 
continuing loss of population from the c ity  through out-m igration (Table 4.2).
Migration from the Area covered by G reater Glasgow Health Board
1971/72
1972/73
1973/74
1974/75
1975/76
In
6924
6556
6982
6601
7667
Out
10,031
17,360
15,675
14,588
19,652
Net
-13,107
-10,804
-8,693
-7,987
-11,985
Table 4.2 Source: Strathclyde Regional Council (1980)
The ra te  a t which the city 's population was declining showed no sign of 
decreasing, despite the run-down of the C.D.A. programme; and this, in turn, 
injected a sense of urgency into discussions on what the city's fu ture housing 
policy should be. When this is combined with the fac t th a t the city was now 
operating in a new local government system, under a changed D istrict Council 
set-up, then the receptivity  of the councillors to  new policies was probably a t its 
highest. One of the facto rs which helped to shape the direction of fu ture housing 
policy,during this com paratively turbulent period ,was the personal leadership of 
Baillie Dick Dynes.
Baillie Dynes peristently  and persuasivel/ argued th a t the ruling Labour group 
should adopt, what he described, as a more liberal and pragm atic approach 
towards housing policy. In particular he persuaded the council to  accept th a t the 
city 's lack of choice in housing tenure was the major facto r contributing to  out­
m igration, particularly of young,economically active fam ilies. If a b e tte r choice 
of houses was made available in the city then this tide of em igration would, he 
argued, be reversed. The D irector of Administration in Glasgow during this 
period has described how, through these efforts on the part of Baillie Dynes, the 
Labour group were "persuaded to  respond to  changing public demand, and to  
break with tradition" in their formulation of fu ture housing policy (Hamilton 
1978). While it would be unwise to  neglect the ex ten t to  which personal 
leadership alone d ic ta ted  Glasgow's future housing policy (officials today still 
regard the role played by Baillie Dynes as having been crucial), there  were a 
number of contem porary events which also contributed towards changing the 
council^ a ttitude  to private housebuilders.
One practical example in particular helped to focus the members' a tten tion  on 
the question of private housebuilding. In the Darnley area, where one of the 
council's la test schemes was being built, the houses were proving to  be extrem ely 
hard to  le t. At the same tim e, however, in one of the few private housing 
developments in the city , a t nearby Darnley Park, com pleted houses were being 
sold as fast as they could be built; a dram atic con trast which the council found 
difficult to ignore.
In addition there  was the introduction of Housing Plans. The background work 
which had to  be done in 1976/77 for the preparation, of the first of these 
documents, forced the council into looking a t all aspects of housing in the city. 
This broader view provided a forum in which the council could consider the 
contribution which private builders could make towards the improvement of 
housing choice in the city.
Finally, a t the national level, there  was by 1976 an intensifying debate on what 
the future direction of inner city policy should be (McKay and Cox 1979). This 
debate helped to focus a tten tion  on what contribution private investm ent might 
make towards the regeneration of cities. In Glasgow, in particu lar, this debate 
becam e enmeshed in the early elaboration of Strathclyde's development strategy . 
A strategy  which, as the previous chapter has already shown, has acknowledged 
from its earliest origins in the West Central Scotland Plan, the "contribution 
which private housebuilders could make towards the up-grading of the city  cen tre  
environment" (West C entral Scotland Plan 1974).
By the end of 1977 a combination of the above events had forced the councillors 
to  look more favourable on the idea of encouraging private housing in the city.
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This culm inated in March 1977 with the Policy and Resources Com m ittee, 
chaired by Baillie Dynes, recommending tha t "there should be no more large 
scale local authority housing developments on the periphery of the city"; and, 
tha t "every e ffo rt should be made to  broaden the range of tenure within the city, 
and the Council should continue to  consider radical new initiatives towards this 
end" (Glasgow D istrict Council 1977). These recommendations were finally 
approved by the  full council on 31st March 1977, just prior to the local elections 
in May 1977.
These views were endorsed, and reinforced in la te r yearsyfespite the vacillation 
of power in a council which contained no majority party . By the end of the 
1970's, however, it had become a view espoused more out of necessity than out of 
choice. The council has been forced to  continually re-exam ine its housing 
policies and programmes in the context of a series of expenditure constraints 
imposed by cen tral governm ent. The sector of council spending most severely 
affected  by these cuts has been housing, particularly new build. This has m eant 
th a t the only way in which a significant house construction programme could be 
carried out in the city was through the  encouragem ent of private housebuilding.
The series of events outlined above have,by  now, seen the councillors', and 
therefore the city 's, a ttitu d e  towards private housebuilders fundamentally 
a ltered . In the past the council greeted almost every application which did come 
forward from private builders by refusing planning permission and then taking 
out a C.P.O. on the site  to  preserve it for local authority housing. In this way 
the city acquired all the suitable housing land almost as soon as it became 
available for developm ent, which m eant th a t all of the large private housing 
programmes were sited outside the city  (McEachran 1975). Now the council's 
efforts are mainly directed  towards a ttrac tin g  more private housebuilding, and it 
is to  an exam ination of the methods used in an a ttem p t to  achieve this objective 
th a t we now turn.
When the  D istrict Council first decided, in 1977, to  encourage private builders to 
work in the city, they im m ediately allocated 3 sites for private housebuilding. 
These sites had previously been earm arked for council housing and were located 
a t Roughmussel, Sandyhills and Whitlawburn, covering 25 ha. in to ta l. The 
council also decided to  cease all council house building a t Summerston in favour 
of a further release of land to  private housebuilders. While a t Darnley the 
projected number of local authority  completions was reduced by 300.
The Sandyhills scheme was subsequently amended to  a 'Build - for - Sale' p ro jec t, 
but the rem ainder of the sites, all council owned, were m arketed by the local 
authority . The development brief was drawn up by both the Planning and Estates 
D epartm ents and the builders invited to  submit tenders for the sites.
At the same tim e the Planning D epartm ent undertook a survey of land, within 
the city , in order to  identify sites which it considered might be suitable for 
private housing. This work was collected into four booklets, listing sites in 
D istrict ownership, Regional ownership and Private ownership. The documents 
were published in 1978 and sold to  private builders for £50. As before tenders 
were invited, and in terested  parties were advised th a t the listing of a site  
implied planning consent, for some kind of private housing developm ent, would be 
available.
An in teresting featu re  of these published lists (Yellow Books) is th a t the Estates 
D epartm ent were authorised "to negotiate directly with any developer in terested  
in a site  owned by the D istric t Council" (MacFadyen 1980). Several developers 
took advantage of this slightly stream lined procedure and, in to ta l, the Yellow 
Books, updated from tim e to  tim e, saw a further 35 ha. of land allocated to 
private housing.
This initial flurry of activ ity  brought forward, for private housebuilding, 
approximately 55-65 ha. of land with a capacity of about 1600 houses - 
approximately half of these are now under construction, the rem ainder have 
developers nominated (Hamilton 1980). The next stage in the council's e ffo rts  to 
a t tra c t  private builders was the d irect result of government constraints on public 
expenditure,which forced the city to  abandon virtually all future plans for main­
stream  council housing.
In response to this the D irector of Housing produced, in March of 1980, the 
"A lternative Strategy: The New Build Housing Programme 1980-85." This
document placed considerable emphasis on the need to  harness the resources of 
the private sector in order to  reduce some of the e ffec ts  of cuts in public 
expenditure. It proposed ,therefore,that 8 sites varying from 1 ha. - 6 ha.in size, 
which had originally been programmed for council housing, be released to  the 
private sector. Some of these are to  be developed as joint initiatives, 
incorporating an elem ent of sheltered housing, but in to ta l the land released is 
sufficient for over 600 private houses (Glasgow D istrict Council 1980a). By the 
end of 1980 Glasgow D istrict were already negotiating with Unit Construction 
Ltd and B arratts Glasgow Ltd on the disposal of two of these sites, each with a 
capacity for more than 50 houses.
The la test initiative being undertaken by the council is the release of land in 
peripheral housing esta tes  a t Easterhouse, Garthamlock and Priesthill. As part 
of this programme greenfield sites , adjacent to  the peripheral e sta tes  * will be 
made available to  private builders. This, however, will be on the s tr ic t 
understanding th a t the builder, a t the same tim e, agrees to  carry out the 
rehabilitation or renewal of part of the existing council house stock.
The greenfield sites which have teen identified for release as part of this 
programme have a capacity  for approximately 1900 houses (Glasgow D istrict 
Council 1980b). Negotiations are already taking place with Laing Homes Ltd and 
Salvesen Homes Ltd on one site ,vhile Bovis Homes Ltd have expressed an 
in terest in one of the other sites. In addition, a consortium headed by John 
Lawrence and McTaggart Mickel have advised Glasgow D istrict Council th a t they 
too wish to  take part in any future discussions concerning the disposal of these 
sites.
The fea tu re  which is common to  all of the above efforts made by the D istrict 
Council is th a t they concentrate  on the release of land which is already owned by 
the local authority . In order to  entourage the private sector to  acquire and 
develop sites not owned by the District Council, the builders are being sent 
copies of the  vacant land chapters for each of the city’s local plan areas. Once 
the builders1 opinions on these sites has been obtained and, bearing in mind those 
views, the  local plan for the area approved; then, as before, the prospective 
developer will be advised of the sites on which planning permission for private 
housing is likely to  be granted. Thereafter however, in the m ajority of cases, the 
owners will still have to  be persuaded to part with the  land.
The sta tu to ry  undertakers are the only other major source of land in the city and 
the principal landowners in this category are  British Rail and the Clyde Port 
Authority. Most of this land, however, is unsuitable for private housing 
development because of e ither its shape or location. As Table k.3  shows, the 
land which is made available by British Rail, for example, is very rarely used for 
housing.
Re-use of Railway Land in 1977 in Glasgow
Size of Parcel (ha,)
New Use (No of Sites) 1-4 4-7 7+
Industry and Warehouses 8 3 1
Other Transport 3 4 1
Scrap Yard 3 4 -
Public Open Space 1 - -
Housing - 2 -
Other 3 1 -
Table 4.3 Source: Dawson (1979)
The one very notable exception to  this is the Robroyston site  in the north of the 
city . This 34 ha. site  formerly a hospital, was originally owned by the G reater 
Glasgow Health Board; a fte r passing through a number of d ifferen t owners 
(including the Scottish Office) it was finally purchased by Salvesen Homes Ltd. 
The site now has outline planning permission for the construction of 750 houses.
The outcome of the above effo rts  has been the com plete transform ation, in the 
space of 5 years, of the situation with regard to the availability of private 
housing land in the city . In 1975 it was almost impossible for a private builder to 
acquire any land in the city  (McEachran 1975). By November 1980 the council 
had identified 280 ha. of land, in various ownerships, which is intended for 
private housing. This is an area sufficient for the construction of over 7000 
houses and a t November of last year there were detailed planning permissions for 
the construction of 3600 private homes (Glasgow D istrict Council 1980c). All of 
this would suggest th a t the council has succeeded in its efforts  to  red irect the 
activ ities of the private builders. There are, however, a number of unresolved 
problems which may thw art the council’s e ffo rts  to  achieve the targeted  1142 
private house completions, per annum, over the next 5 years (Strathclyde 
Regional Council 1980).
A  The viability of a number of the sites identified by the council, for private 
housings has been questioned by several builders. As Baron (1980b) has pointed 
out, to  the private builder a site  can be "unviable because of physical, planning or 
m arket lim itations". While Glasgow D istrict Council have managed to  elim inate 
many of the old planning problems, the other difficulties remain.
The actual cost of carrying out building work on redevelopm ent sites, 
particularly  in cities, is generally much higher than for similar developments on 
virgin greenfield sites. Site clearance and developm ent costs were said by all of 
the  builders to  be a major constraint on a number of the proposed sites in 
Glasgow. In some cases the sale of D istrict Council owned land has been 
conditional upon the local authority completing any required site  clearance work; 
B arra tts  have purchased a number of sites from the city in this way. This, 
however, involves the D istrict Council in incurring costs which are not usually 
recovered in the sale price. The ex ten t to  which they can carry out this work is 
therefore  stric tly  lim ited.
A particularly  severe problem in this respect is th a t posed by the  under-mining of 
extensive tra c ts  of the city . As the city 's chief planner has noted, this will 
probably have severely limiting e ffec t in the scope for developm ent. And there 
is little  or nothing the planning authority  can do until such tim e as instability, 
caused by mining, is recognised by cen tral governm ent as industrial dereliction, 
and grants are provided for the rehabilitation of this ground (Hamilton 1980).
The size of some of the sites designated for p rivate housing has also a ttrac ted  
criticism  from a number of builders. Only one quarter of all the  sites intended 
for private housing are larger than 2 ha; a figure referred  to  by many builders as 
being the sm allest they would consider purchasing. This problem, however, is 
less severe than these figures might initially suggest.
Although only 25 per cent of the sites m eet what many builders regard as their 
minimum size requirem ent, the carrying capacity  of these plots accounts for 
m ore than 80 per cent of the city's programmed, private house completions 
(Glasgow D istrict Council 1980c).
In addition, where other facto rs have been favourable, the builders have carried 
out developments on sites which are less than 2 ha. in size. Bovis have, for 
example, com pleted a developm ent of only 15 houses, on 0.2 ha. a t Bridgeton; 
and where the conditions are suitable other builders have taken on sites of a 
sim ilar size.
In discussions the builders invariably placed more emphasis on the quality of the 
environment surrounding a vacant site , than on the actual size of the plot itself. 
They have, therefore , consistently urged the D istrict Council to  divert more of 
their resources to  carrying out environmental improvements. But  ^as the 
D irectors of both Housing and Planning have pointed out, the city 's existing 
com m itm ents and resources lim it the extent to  which this can be done (Glasgow 
D istrict Council 1980b). As a consequence, ra ther than as a preference, the 
builders have favoured, on the whole, the development of larger sites which allow 
them to c rea te  the ir own environm ent.
One further area  of concern for the builder is the cost of land acquisition. As
explained in chapter two, the price th a t the builder can afford to  pay for land
will depend on the likely m arket price of the com pleted dwellings and the costs
of developm ent, including an adequate margin for profit. Since development
costs on city  sites are higher than on virgin land, the price which a builder can
pay for such land will invariably be less than what he could offer for a similar
greenfield site  (Stone 1972). The builders have also pointed out th a t the selling
price of houses, on city  sites, can be 5 to  10 per cent lower than for a similar
house in the suburbs. This fu rther reduces the price they can afford to pay for 
city centre land.
7 H-
The problems which the builders have encountered in this respect are most 
commonly associated with the purchase of land from private owners. The price 
paid for local authority owned land is usually arrived a t through negotiation with 
the Estates D epartm ent who, in most cases, have the authority  to  conclude the 
deal without referring back to  the council. As the officials, however, have 
pointed out, the im portant point here is tha t the political environment within the 
council is such th a t neither officers nor members can now be seen turning away 
private housebuilders. This has m eant tha t in the sale of council owned housing 
land the city has had to  accept w hatever offers were made by the builders.
In contrast to  this, the building firms have experienced problems in their 
a ttem pts to  buy land from other owners. The particular aspect of land 
acquisition which has been fraught with most difficulties is the purchase of land 
in multiple ownership. Several builders, including Bovis, Wimpey and B arratts, 
have experienced difficulties, in obtaining land, which were directly attributab le  
to this factor. The problem was invariably either the owner of a small piece of 
land, essential to  a larger development, holding out for what the builders 
considered as an exorbitant price; or the ownership of some sites being so 
complex tha t negotiations on a possible purchase price could not even be s tarted .
The builders have subm itted th a t in these circum stances the council should be 
prepared to use its compulsory purchase powers to acquire and assemble sites 
prior to  reselling them to private builders. The Chief Surveyor however, has 
pointed out th a t the financial position in the city is such th a t "there is no 
question in the im m ediate future of the local authority buying land to  make it 
available for private housing" (MacFadyen 1980); particularly  as the cost of 
acquisition would not necessarily be recovered by the council.
As in a number of instances described above, the capacity of the planning process 
to  actively intervene in the management of m arket forces is circum scribed by 
external pressures; the planners role being ultim ately a passive one ra ther than 
an active one. The continued success of their policies will depend therefore  on 
how other in terested  parties respond to  the initiatives made by the planners. It 
is possible in this respect to identify some areas of potential conflict and 
difficulty.
5 One area in which the conflict seems likely to  intensify in the near fu ture is in 
the response from surrounding D istrict Councils. The recent moves being made 
by Glasgow D istrict Council, to  encourage private housing on greenfield sites on 
the periphery of the city , has antagonized a number of local authorities. It is 
c lear th a t while they are willing to  accept th a t private housing should be 
encouraged in the inner city, perhaps even a t their expense; they are equally 
determ ined th a t the greenbelt which separates them  from the city should not be 
used for housebuilding of any kind,for whatever reason (Strathclyde Regional 
Council 1980b).
The planners in Glasgow D istrict Council, however, are well aware th a t in order 
to  maintain the momentum which has been created  in the allocation of sites for 
private housing,then the release of greenbelt land, within the city boundary, may 
have to  be considered. This however, is one issue which, unlike the Structure 
Plan, will alm ost certainly a ttra c t the unanimous opposition of all the other 
d istric t councils, making it extrem ely difficult for Glasgow to  adopt this course 
of action.
Although the reactions of other d istric t councils are im portant in determining 
the  future patte rn  of private housing in Glasgow; the area in which the planners
are most vulnerable is in their dependence upon the co-operation and support of a 
com paratively small number of building firms.
The only firms which have taken part in site  purchasing and actual housebuilding, 
on any significant scale^are the largest of the incoming firms whose activ ities 
were described in chapter three, and labelled as growth oriented in chapter two. 
The Scottish based firm s, despite the in terest shown in some sites by Lawrence 
and McTaggart Mickel, have been described by the planners as being incredibly 
cautious, and as yet have undertaken no major developments within the city. 
While even some of the medium - sized English based firms would,at best, only 
consider the la ter development of small sites around the edge of larger esta tes  
constructed by the volume builders.
The future ra te  of housebuilding in the city will depend,therefore, on the support 
of less than half-a-dozen large national companies. Worse still the foundation on 
which th a t support is based proves, on examination, to  be extrem ely fragile.
The in terest which these firms have shown in city cen tre  sites has often been 
explained by referring to  the g rea ter expertise, and broader resource base of 
large national companies. The only builders who can afford to  take the risks 
which are involved in the development of these sites are large firms like 
B arratts, Bovis, Wimpey and Salvesen. At the same tim e, the quality and the 
location of the sites invariably d ic ta tes tha t the only houses which will sell on 
them will be those which suit the 'first - tim e1 buyer; the kind of house which 
only the largest firms can build a t a profit.
All of this implies th a t it is only this small cadre of firms which have developed 
the experience to recognise, w ithout prejudice, the profit-m aking potential of 
city  cen tre  sites. The builders them selves will usually add th a t they have 
switched some of their investm ent to  these areas because they have perceived a
c h a n g e  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  h o u s i n g  m a r k e t .
All the volume builders pointed out th a t it was becoming more and more difficult 
to sell houses, particulary to first-tim e buyers - their main m arket, which were 
located any further than 15 to  20 kilom etres from the city . The builders have, 
therefore, in the words of B arra tts ' chairm an in Scotland, welcomed the 
opportunity to build in the city , where they believe there is a huge unsatisfied 
demand for further private housing (Bruce 1980).
Although this provides part of the explanation for the patte rn  of private 
housebuilding in Glasgow; and would appear to  guarantee the builders will 
continue in their own in terests to support this policy, it ignores one further, and 
less favourable, facto r: These are all firm s which were picked out in chapter 
th ree  as being under the most intense pressure to  find land and build houses. And 
because of the nature of the land m arket in West Central Scotland they were 
forced to build in areas which they did not consider as ideal.
The higher costs and risks, both anathem a to  the private builder, associated with 
in-town housing give it a low priority in the builders' list of preferences. 
Therefore, while the builders readily acknowledge th a t the best m arket for the 
first-tim e  buyers is now relatively close to the city , given a choice of locations 
they would still opt for suburban greenfield sites. In view of this, if the 
Secretary of State 's instructions regarding the Structure Plan's housing policies 
result in the release of peripheral sites, then the builders will alm ost certainly 
reconsider their com m itm ent to in-town private housing. As Nicholls e t al (1980) 
recognised in their work, and as the planners in Glasgow D istrict Council are only 
too well aware, without restric tive  policies on peripheral development then it 
will be impossible to  sustain the builders' in te rest in city cen tre  sites. It is,
however, even more im portant to ensure th a t not only is there a restriction  on 
peripheral developm ent, but also tha t the builder can expect th a t restric tion  to 
be consistently enforced.
In the development of sites for in-town private housing the first phase of any 
project will frequently be com pleted a t a loss (Baron 1980b). It is not until the 
builder has created  the environment, and hence the m arket for private housing, 
tha t he will be able to make a return on his investment. In Govan,for exam ple, 
Salvesen have invested £ 1M in the first stage of a development expecting, a t 
best, to  break even on the project. On la te r phases, however, the firm will make 
a profit on the site having used this initial expenditure to  c rea te  a suitable 
environment and hence a viable m arket.
This implies th a t if these building firms believe there  is any possibility of 
peripheral sites being released in the near future then they may well cancel their 
plans to  continue with similar, 'trail-blazing* investm ents. Bearing in mind the 
be tte r, and easier financial rewards which can be obtained from the development 
of suburban greenfield sites, there will be no reason to commit their resources to 
risky in-town housing when they might be more productively employed elsew here, 
and a t a la ter date.
The uncertainty which has been created  by the necessity for S trathclyde Region 
to re-consider its housing policies clearly creates problems for Glasgow D istrict 
Council. Although the builders will continue to operate on the sites where they 
have already com m itted resources, there  will be a natural reluctance to  proceed 
on any new development until the future land position in the area is made clear. 
It will require only a change in the company policy of four or five firms, based 
perhaps on no more than the hope generated by the Secretary of S tate 's 
comments, to  sabotage future private investment in in-town housing. Unless
y y
th e re  is both firm and predictable support for restric tive  planning policies then 
the builders will simply postpone future developments and aw ait more favourable 
circum stances.
Future planning for private sector housebuilding in Glasgow w ill, th e re fo re , be 
subject to  two constraints. F irst there  is the need to  allow for the increased 
resistance from other d istrict councils: Second, there  is the city 's dependence on 
only a few building firms whose support is given only because they lack a supply 
of a lte rnative  sites to  develop. These are both areas in which it is difficult for 
the d is tric t planning departm ent to  effectively  exercise control.
4.6 This chapter has helped to elucidate the role which local polititians can play in 
influencing the private sector. While, as suggested in chapter two, the local 
authority  may lack the means to  intervene economically in the process of private 
housebuilding, the local political response can clearly play an im portant role in 
creating the right atm osphere for private sector investm ent. Neverthless, in a 
number of areas, the control which cen tral government has on expenditure levels, 
grants and, ultim ately, land-use policies, has also been seen to  circum scribe the 
actions of local planners. In spite of this Glasgow, with the help of Strathclyde 
Region, has achieved a significant degree of success in its e ffo rts  to  manage the 
investm ent pa tterns of private housebuilders; but some of this success is due to  
the unique circum stances which currently exist in the  land m arket. As explained 
above, if these circum stances should change in any way then the continued 
support of the  firm s currently  building private houses in Glasgow is very much in 
doubt.
CHAPTER FIVE
SOME CONCLUSION ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
LAND USE-PLANNING AND THE MARKET
5.1 This study has focussed on the in teraction betw een planners and housebuilders in 
order to draw out some of the features which characterise the relationship 
betw een planning and the  m arket. In the firs t chapter a case was made out for 
planning to  intervene in the operation of m arket processes in order to  allow for 
both a more efficient and more equitable allocation of resources.
In the particular case considered in chapters three and four, the planners' 
objective has been to  divert the activ ities of private housebuilders towards 
declining urban areas. The motives for this are mixed; it is partly  to  avoid 
costly duplication of urban in frastructure  i.e. efficiency, and partly  to locate 
new investm ent where it might generate  concom itant social and w elfare 
advantages i.e. equity. In a ttem pting to  m eet these objectives, through the 
control of the private sector, it was anticipated, however, th a t the planning 
process would encounter a number of problems.
It is now possible to identify those areas of both plan-making and plan- 
im plem entation where the a ttem pts made to  control m arket forces are most 
likely to  m eet with resistance.
5.2 The planning authority is clearly constrained in its e ffo rts  to  devise effective  
policies by its lim ited capacity  to  intervene in the economics of private 
housebuilding. The planner is compelled to  rely on indirect controls "whose 
e ffec t is to  s truc tu re  situations into which individual actions must be adapted" 
(Friedmann 1973). In the case of land-use planning, these indirect controls have 
concentrated  on the physical aspects of land management; their im pact on the 
m arket relying upon "the imposition of physical standards and the m aintenance 
of ra ther crude zoning arrangem ents" (Harrison 1979). On this basis alone, 
however, it is difficult to  construct planning policies which are not only
recognised to  lie within the term s of the current legislation, but which also have 
the potential to  successfully influence the developm ental process.
In the context of this particu lar study, the private land m arket is one area in 
which the powers available to  carry out land-use planning display certain  
lim itations. In chapter two a general exam ination of the mechanisms which 
operate in the land m arket suggested th a t planners would find it d ifficult to  
influence the outcom e, or e ffec ts , of land transactions. In chapter three  the 
problems which this can c rea te  for the planning process were made even clearer.
The motives of one group of land owners - the Scottish based builders, were 
shown to conflict with those of another group - the incoming volume builders. As 
an investm ent, the Scottish based builders had built up, over the years, an 
extensive land bank in the peripheral suburbs of Glasgow. Strathclyde Regional 
Council had originally intended to  control this land bank through the revocation 
of existing planning permissions. This policy, however, had proved, on 
examination, to  be too costly and it was la te r abandoned. Much of this land, 
therefore , was still zoned for private residential housing.
In contrast to  this, the incoming firms had no im m ediate source of land, and 
despite buying out existing firm s and purchasing land from other builders, could 
not obtain a supply of housing land sufficient to  m eet their needs - they 
im m ediately sought the release of more land. For the planner, the difficulty is, 
th a t although there  are significant tra c ts  of land already zoned for private 
housing, and owned by builders, he has no means by which to  ensure this land is 
made available to the firm s who actually want to  build on it.
The present powers which the local au thorities possess to  deal with this kind of 
problem, and even those powers which they form erly held under the Community 
Land Act, are heavily circum scribed and too expensive to implement. Therefore, 
the number of opportunities for local au thorities "to mount entrepreneurial
ventures into the land m arket, in order to  secure the availablity of land in a 
positive way, have been very lim ited" (Groves 1980). The lim ited ability of the 
planning authority to intervene positively in the land m arket is, however, in 
contradistinction to  its powers for preventing developm ent. The consistent 
application of these negative powers successfully ostracized the private 
housebuilders from Glasgow for over 25 years. It should not be forgotten, 
however, th a t the planner’s ability to  refuse permission for a developm ent does 
not necessarily prevent th a t project a ltogether. The planner's main activ ity  "is 
to  redistribute development from one piece of land to  another" (Broadbent 1977); 
and as pointed out, while the planner can repress a development in one area ,he  
cannot d ic ta te , or positively influence,where it does ultim ately take place.
The difference which the possession of these powers could make to  the planning 
process is well illustrated in chapter four, where Glasgow's effo rts  to  a ttra c t 
private housebuilders w ere considered. Over several years the planning authority 
had steadily acquired a significant supply of land, originally designated for 
council housing. When the decision was made to  encourage private sector 
housing in the c ity ,th e  controlled release of parts of this land bank, combined 
with the negative controls partially  imposed on peripheral sites, was able to  
positively influence the patte rn  of p rivate  housebuilding. If negative controls 
alone had been employed, with the planners being unable to  ensure there  was an 
existing supply of land in the areas where they wished private housebuilding to  
take place, then it is unlikely th a t the policy could have succeeded. The key 
point in the control of private secto r investm ent is, not only must development 
be prevented in some areas; but also the resources which are necessary for th a t 
development, particularly  land, must be available in the areas where the planner 
wishes to  encourage investm ent.
This would suggest th a t in order to  both satisfy  the  builders' demands for land, 
and give the planning process an opportunity to  influence m arket forces, then
local authorities will need g rea ter encouragem ent and resources to  intervene in 
the land m arket. If this is not done,then the allocation and programming of land 
for private housing will re flec t idealised objectives, not realistic  policies. 
Furtherm ore, without this kind of help the planning process will be unable to  use 
the m anagement of m arket forces as a means of controlling fu ture patterns of 
development.
In its  efforts to  control m arket forces the land-use planning system is 
constrained not only by the internal lim itations on its powers but also by the need 
to take account of a number of ex ternal pressures.
In chapter two the possibility was considered th a t the local political environment 
might play an im portant role in determ ining the relationship between land-use 
planning and the private sector. This was, in fac t, quite clearly the case in 
Glasgow. For many years the political ideology of the council was one which 
re jected  the private sector as a leg itim ate source of investm ent in housebuilding. 
The a ttitude  of the councillors "was one of single-minded concentration on 
municipal housing to  the exclusion of all else" (MacFadyen 1980). In the 
circum stances the planning process was only called upon to fulfill a negative, 
regulatory role in order to  prevent private housing developments. The 
relationship between land-use planning and the m arket was one in which there  
was very little  room for manoeuvre, and where the planner had few opportunities 
to  exercise his discretion.
In recen t years, however, Glasgow's councillors have been forced, through a 
varie ty  of circum stances to  modify their opinions. They have now accepted the 
view th a t the economic decline of the c ity  is so massive th a t it can only be 
effectively  tackled by a combination of public and private investm ent. In 
particu lar, the councillors have been persuaded th a t the housing problems of the 
area  cannot be alleviated without the help of the private housebuilder. It is now
hoped th a t an increase in owner-occupied housing in the city will in turn lead to  a 
variety of social, economic and physical benefits for the whole area. For land- 
use planning this implies a major change in its relationship with m arket forces, as 
represented by the private housebuilders.
The planners are now under pressure to  ensure th a t the political com m itm ent of 
the council to  "broadening housing choice and increasing opportunities for owner- 
occupation in the city" is implemented (Glasgow D istrict Council 1980b). In 
order to  do this the planner must a ttem p t to  break down the barriers which exist 
between the two sides, public and private, and thus forge some kind of 
partnership with the private builder. This,however, is not an objective which can 
be easily achieved. As Hambleton (1980) points out, the level of mutual d istrust 
between these two worlds is inordinately high. The pecuniary motives of private 
sector agencies, such as housebuilders, remains anathem a to  the planner; while 
"the utopian unrealities of abstrac t planning policies produce intense cynicism on 
the part of the developm ent industry" (R atcliffe 1976).
This is a communication gap which Friedmann (1973) considers can only be closed 
by a "continuing series of personal and primarily verbal transactions" between 
the two sides. In this model, conflicts will be overcome by a "mutual desire to  
continue in the life of dialogue" (Friedmann 1973.) Friend e t al (1974) have 
elaborated on some aspects of this them e,assum ing as their starting  point th a t 
the lack of co-ordination between organisations is the result of lack of knowledge 
about each others problems and in terests. This block to  effective  co-ordination 
can,however, be overcome through developing b e tte r methods of communication, 
mainly, through inter-personal contacts. The mutual awareness created  among 
the various agencies,and individuals,with in terests in the course of development 
in an area,w ill, it is anticipated, lead to  some change in the form, location and 
tim ing of development (Healey 1979).
The officials a t Glasgow D istrict Council in their effo rts  to  bridge the 
communication gap between them and the private sector, have tried  to  follow 
the above course of action,and develop a closer and more direct relationship with 
private housebuilders. In the pursuit of this objective the officers have been 
supported by the councillors who, for example, have authorised the E states 
D epartm ent to negotiate directly  with potential purchasers of council owned 
housing land. In addition, both the Houshg and Planning departm ents have been 
involved in d irect negotiations with the private builders over the release of land 
on the peripheral council house esta tes  (Glasgow D istrict Council 1980b). These 
changes have helped to  improve the level of communication between the two 
sides, and they have contributed to  GJasgow’s success in a ttrac tin g  private 
builders into the city.
A ttention,how ever,m ust be drawn to  the iact th a t the meetings which take place 
between the two sides are not only to  allow for improved communications, but 
also about exchange. The liason between the two sides is one in which each now 
antic ipates concessions from the other. Where bargaining such as this takes 
place power, as Jowell (1977) points out, will determ ine the outcome of the 
negotiations. The planner m ust, therefore, tread  warily in his effo rts  to  improve 
the level of inter-personal relationships with private sector agencies such as 
housebuilders. If the planner loses sight of the in terests and values which legitim ­
a tes his involvement in this process,then he may unwittingly concede more to  his 
opposite number than he originally intended. While it is possible to  admit there 
is some common ground betw een the  two sides, the m otivating force of each still 
remains fundamentally d ifferen t. Land-use planning must, therefore , in its 
efforts  to  control m arket forces, balance the need for improved communications 
with private sector agencies, against the dangers of too close an identification 
with their in terests and motives.
5.4 The local political environment has clearly contributed to a change in the 
relationship between land-use planning and the m arket. However, as indicated in 
chapter two, centrally controlled economic policy has proved to  be a more 
pervasive influence on the private builder -local planner relationship.
The effo rts  which Glasgow D istrict Council have made to  encourage private 
housebuilding are partly due to  the e ffe c t which public expenditure cuts have had 
on the city . These cuts have forced the council to  abandon most of its 
m ainstream  local authority housing. This has further m otivated the council in its 
e ffo rts  to  encourage private builders to  work in the city , and therefo re  has 
contributed to  the change which took place in the city's a ttitu d e  towards private 
sector housing. These broad economic forces have also been instrum ental in 
determ ining the means which are made available to  the land-use planning system 
for the control of the private sector.
In Glasgow the local authority has very few resources which it can allocate to 
s ite  improvement or site assembly due to  the restrain ts on public spending. The 
planners are consequently res tric ted  in the ex tent to which they can positively 
influence the availability of land for private housing. Sites which might 
otherwise have been considered suitable for future development must be 
disregarded because of e ither problems of ownership or dereliction. The effo rts  
made by Strathclyde Region to  control private housing, by the revoking of 
planning permission, were similarly re s tric ted . The costs involved were found to 
lie well beyond the council's means and as a result they were forced to  abandon 
the  policy.
Government economic policy has also been an im portant fac to r influencing the 
actions of the housebuilders. C urrent economic policy has badly affected  the 
ability of builders to finance their activ ities and consumers to  purchase the 
com pleted houses. The result has been a significant decrease in the number of
housing s ta rts  in 1980 (fig 2*1)* This has created  some apprehension amongst 
planners in Glasgow D istrict Council. In recen t months there  has been a 
reduction in the sale and building ra tes in the city . The higher cost of in-town 
housebuilding, exacerbated by the risks and uncertain ties which accompany such 
projects, make them a prime ta rg e t for cut-backs when the builders are looking 
for areas in which to  make savings. If the situation was to  rem ain unchanged for 
any length of tim e, to be followed by a release of suburban sites, then the future 
of private housing in the city would be very uncertain.
It is, however, not only the economic but also the social objectives of cen tral 
government which can influence the planning - m arket relationship. The 
em pathy which would appear to exist between the current government and the 
housebuilding lobby has helped to  create  the clim ate for private m arket 
decisions. The sym pathetic hearing which the Secretary of S ta te  accorded to  the 
case presented by the housebuilders a t Strathclyde's E.I.P. , is sym ptom atic of 
events throughout Britain. Over the last 2 years the housebuilders have 
com m ented on 25 s tructure  plans and 18 have been amended to  include the 
release of additional land (Planning 1981). As Elson (1981) points out, planners 
are therefore  in danger of "being compelled to  allocate for additional 
development large areas which, because of the recession, may not be built on for 
some years" (Elson 1981). Equally, the release of this land could make it 
extrem ely difficult for the planning system to exercise effective  control over the 
actions of private builders.
It is clear from the above th a t the policies of cen tral governm ent, on both the 
economic and social level, can a ffec t not just the means available to  carry out 
land-use planning, but also the very nature of the m arket with which the planner 
has to work. The policies tha t the planning system uses to  control the actions of 
private sector agencies must be, therefore , sufficiently adaptable to  cope with 
the changes imposed by external forces. If this is not done then the use of
inappropriate controls, in the wrong circjm stances, might give unexpected and 
unwanted results.
The land-use planning system, in its efforts to  control m arket forces, must also 
take  account of- the conflicting views expressed by neighbouring local authorities.
In the case of Strathclyde Region's Structure Plan ,the opinions voiced by the 
d is tric t councils ranged from qualified approval to  outright opposition. There 
was such a broad spectrum  of argum ents put forward th a t it is d ifficult to see 
how any one in particular could have had more influence than another. The most 
im portant point, however, is th a t because the Region was faced with such a 
mixed reaction to its policies then the inevitable.; internal wrangles which 
followed ,weakened the Plans credibility. The Plan, therefore , appeared to  lack a 
firm basis of support, and not even Glasgow, the one area  likely to benefit most 
from the stra tegy , was 100 per cent behind the Region. This was a weakness 
which the private sector was able to  exploit in their e ffo rts  to  overturn the 
policies concerned with the control of housing land.
Glasgow D istrict Council are also hampered in their a ttem pts to  influence the 
location of private housing by the reaction of surrounding d istric ts. If Glasgow's 
planners did decide to  release more land on the edge of the city , possibly 
greenfield sites, for the use of private builders, then they would be m et by strong 
opposition from the neighbouring local authorities. These areas are willing to 
accept the diversion of private investm ent for the purpose of redeveloping inner 
city  sites. They, however, are not prepared to  accep t th a t the private sector 
should build on greenfield sites in the city .
It is c lear from the above, th a t the im plem entation of a stra tegy  intended to 
control or divert m arket forces is not easy. There is such a variety  of conflicting 
opinions to  be taken into account th a t it is difficult to construct the framework
for an e ffective  yet realistic  policy.
One mechanism which might be used for this purpose is the National Planning 
Guildelines, introduced into Scottish Planning in 1977. At present these 
guidelines cover five subject areas, setting out Scottish Office policy and 
providing inform ation for planning authorities.
As Diamond (1979) points out, the topics co^ftiljis& ftilly  extended to  include the 
spatial distribution of urban populations. This would help to  define, a t the 
appropriate national or regional level, the objectives to  be pursued in the 
allocation of housing land, and it would also give s tructu re  plans an explicit set 
of c rite ria  against which to  measure their objectives. N evertheless,it would be 
naive to  assume, th a t by following this course of action, further conflict over the 
allocation of housing land could be completely elim inated. But it would a t least 
provide a more appropriate arena in which to  judge the wider consequences of 
d ifferen t policy options.
5.6 In chapter one it was made clear th a t if the planning process is to  effectively  
tackle the goals of efficiency and equity, then, particularly  in the case of the 
la tte r , the way in which the m arket does operate  must be challenged. One area 
where land-use planning is particularly  vulnerable in its e ffo rts  to  achieve this 
objective is in the tendency to  underestim ate, or ignore, the influence of past 
and prevailing m arket trends.
In chapter th ree  the influence which existing m arket forces can have on the 
planning process were discussed in some detail. The way in which the housing 
and land m arkets had evolved in Strathclyde had encouraged some builders to  
develop vested in terest in certain  areas. These were advantages which they 
would be unlikely to  relinquish without a fight. At the same tim e, the monopoly
advantages enjoyed by these firm s forced other incoming builders to  com pete for 
a proportionately sm aller share of the land m arket. These firm s, therefore , were 
also certain  to  oppose any policies proposed by the  Region, which might prevent 
them from having the same benefits in similar areas. The operation of these 
particular m arket forces had generated a momentum which the planning system 
would find it d ifficult to  resist; and the regional planners, therefore , were likely 
to  be under intense pressure to  release more land. This would suggest th a t the 
residential land policies proposed by the Region would have to  be based on a 
sound understanding of past and recen t trends in the  land and housing m arkets. 
As chapter th ree , however, points out the evidence from the Strathclyde E.I.P. 
would suggest th a t this was not the case.
The planners displayed only a rudim entary and partia l knowledge of the way in 
which these m arkets worked. The housebuilders, in con trast, had assembled a 
detailed, and apparently, au thorita tive , analysis of the prevailing m arket 
position. In the absence of any persuasive counter-argum ents from the planners, 
this particular ’view of the fu tu re’ was accepted as being the more realistic.
This clearly implies th a t if the planner is to  influence the direction taken by 
m arket forces then he must fully appreciate the struc tu ra l context within which 
he is operating. In addition, where planning is trying to  control the  way in which 
the m arket operates /then an understanding of the recen t past, as proposed by 
Friedm ann (1973), is essential, if the possible points a system offers for s tra teg ic  
and effective  intervention are to  be identified. Finally, once the policies to  
control the operation of the m arket have been decided on, then they must be 
applied with both firmness and consistency. If this is not done then the 
momentum which characterises the operation of m arket forces will inevitably 
sweep aside good intentioned, but weakly im plem ented policies. Thus, not only 
m ust a plan be adaptable in order, as suggested earlier, to  cope with changing
circum stances; it must also display resolution when it comes to  the application of 
a chosen strategy.
In a mixed economy it is clear, th a t if land-use planning is to  achieve certain  
objectives then it must try  to  work with, or through, m arket forces. There is a 
growing realisation th a t, in consequence, planners need to  understand m arket 
mechanisms more fully and use them more wisely than they have in the past 
(Willmott 1973). This study has used the example of p rivate  housebuilders to 
highlight some of the difficulties which the planning system faces in its e ffo rts  to  
achieve this objective. The evidence which has been assembled suggests th a t 
there are  certain  weaknesses which make it d ifficult for planning to  effectively  
influence m arket trends. If some a tten tion , however, is given to  the problems 
and proposals outlined above, then a more sensitive and revitalized system of 
land-use planning could more effectively  contribute to the control of m arket 
forces.
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